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Representation of Multiple Criminal
Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and
the Professional Responsibilities
of the Defense Attorney
John Stewart Geer*
. Reflecting on the limits of the judiciary's power independently
to protect liberty, Learned Hand once observed,
It is idle to look to laws, or courts, or principalities, or powers, to
secure [liberty]. You may write into your constitutions not ten, but
fifty, amendments, and it shall not help a farthing, for casuistry will
undermine it as casuistry should, if it have no stay but law.'
The principle, indeed one may call it a fact, that Judge Hand
articulates is hardly limited to liberty. There is much of critical sig-
nificance to the administration of justice that cannot be effectuated
by a rule of law and that ultimately depends for its vitality on the
dedication and honor of the lawyers into whose hands the privilege
and responsibility of administering the law have been commended.
But the practicing bar has often permitted such considerations to be
ignored or deemphasized in the natural but ultimately misguided
effort to make a11 decisions conform to the dictates of "practicality."2
* Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the contribution of Lynn D. Goldsmith, Suffolk University Law
School, Class of 1977, whose substantial research assistance and constructive criti.
cisms were invaluable to the preparation of this Article.
1. 'Hand, Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 9 (1930).
2. Cf. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARv.
L. l~v. 702 (1977). Professor Morgan, in a general review of the ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, has concluded that the Code's provisions reflect a consistent
misordering of priorities:
[I]n fact, the present [Code] stands the proper priority of . .. interests
on its head. The Code makes the interest of the individual attorney primary.
In second position is the interest of clients, particularly those client interests
which diverge from the interests of the public. The public interest [in a just
and expeditious resolution of disputes] comes third and last repeatedly.
Id. at 706. He does not, however, suggest that this lamentable fact results from con-
scious exercise of self-interest. Rather,
[i]t seems likely that the Code's biases reflect the fact that whenever the
ABA or any other ethics body has come upon a tough ethical issue, it has
tried to be "practical" in its solution. Because lawyers have consistently been
the ones judging "practicality," at points of conflict [their own interests]
have repeatedly, albeit nonconsciously, prevailed.
Id. at 740.
This misordering of priorities is also apparent in certain practices of lawyers. For
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Where such reordering of priorities occurs, the legal system suffers a
harm that is both tangible and metaphysical.3
example, the practice of allowing one attorney to represent more than one criminal
defendant unequivocally benefits only the attorney by giving him a greater total fee
than he would be able to charge a single client. By contrast, the benefit to the client
is equivocal. On the one hand, the per capita cost of representation is likely to be lower
and the efficacy of a stone wall defense enhanced. On the other hand, however, the
client will often suffer significantly from the potential for divisions of his attorney's
loyalties inherent in such situations. Finally, multiple representation represents an
unmitigated disaster in terms of the fair and expeditious resolution of criminal mat.
ters. Each of these elements will be explored in some detail below. For the moment,
however, suffice it to say that Morgan's analysis of the way in which priorities are
currently ordered appears to be as true of the multiple representation question as it is
of legal ethics generally.
3. The fact that the profession's resolution of ethical controversy so consistently
coincides with lawyers' own self-interests has not gone unnoticed. The ethical stan-
dards of the profession are under increasing scrutiny, and neither courts nor commen-
tators have been particularly impressed with what they find. See, e.g., Bates v. State
Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility's
prohibition on advertising routine legal services violated the first amendment); Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (holding that promulgation of a
minimum fee schedule by a state bar association violated the antitrust laws); Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding portions of the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility governing pretrial and trial publicity violative of
the first amendment), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); J. AUEIRACH, UNEQUAL JUS-
TICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976); VERDICTS ON LAWYERS
(R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1976); Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyer, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); Morgan, supra note 2; Note, Client
Fraud and the Lawyer-An Ethical Analysis, 62 MINN. L. REV. 89 (1977).
Indeed, some members of the judiciary have not been content to confine their
expressions of dissatisfaction to the bench. See, e.g., Burger, Standards of Conduct for
Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CaiM. L.Q. 11 (1966);
Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1971, 57 AB.A.J. 855 (1971). In the latter
article, after noting the availability of comprehensive standards designed to govern and
guide the practicing bar, Chief Justice Burger emphasizes the enforcement responsi-
bilities of state bar associations:
Those standards, taken together, offer the best hope for maintaining an
honorable and effective Bar, and every state bar association should move
now to establish means to make sure these standards are vigorously enforced.
Without strict enforcement of ethical standards, the Bar will fail in its mis-
sion, and it will never have, and it will never deserve, the confidence of the
public.
Id. at 857-58. Taking a somewhat more pessimistic view, Judge Bazelon feels that "the
bar associations, like most professional societies, have shown themselves unable, or at
least unwilling, to police their own members. Our vaunted 'Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility' has not served as a means of policing the quality of defense counsel."
Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 17 (1973).
Nor are such sentiments limited to those intimately connected with the legal
profession. It is not without justification that, in the eyes of many, the legal profession
itself has emerged from the Watergate scandal as an unindicted coconspirator.
The breadth and depth of this disillusionment with the profession's ethical stan.
dards and behavior strike at the very foundation of the judicial system: its credibility.
[Vol. 62:119
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The difficulties that surround an attorney's attempt to simul-
taneously represent multiple criminal defendants presents exactly
this sort of a problem. The sixth amendment's guarantee of "Assist-
ance of Counsel" has been interpreted to embrace a right to legal
assistance "untrammeled and unimpaired" by conflicting duties and
loyalties.4 The importance of this right to our system of justice is ob-
vious. But the persistent practice of multiple representation and its
inevitable potential for conflicts of interest pose a threat to that right
for which constitutional5 and judicial' remedies are ill-suited. Ulti-
mately, elimination of the dangers present in multiple representa-
tions must depend upon the willingness of the bar to forego certain
advantages that the practice offers in an effort to achieve a goal
critical to the effective administration of justice. In short, the answer
Without a popular conviction that those who administer the law have as their primary
concern the attainment of justice, the effectiveness of the system is ultimately jeopard-
ized. Conduct worthy of public respect, however, cannot be mandated by law or ethi-
cal code. It will come only when lawyers themselves have recognized that the public
interest must be the first priority rather than the last.
4. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
5. The sixth, amendment mandates not merely assistance of counsel, but
effective assistance. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). It can be argued,
and indeed it is the position of this Article, that a lawyer cannot effectively represent
two criminal defendants. Thus, it would not be too great a leap simply to read the sixth
amendment as guaranteeing a right to separate counsel. This will not, however, solve
the problems inherent in multiple representation. It is relatively rare that double
representation is imposed upon a defendant, but see Holloway v. State, 260 Ark. 250,
539 S.W.2d 435 (1976), cert. granted, 430 U.S. 965 (1977) (No. 76-5856), and in such
cases the existingsixth amendment standards are probably sufficient to safeguard the
defendant's interests. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). Usually the
defendants themselves approve of the multiple representation for a variety of reasons.
The desires of the client, however, are probably not the most important factor to be
considered. The public itself has a significant interest in the just and expeditious
disposition of criminal matters that is often frustrated by the possible unfairness to
the defendant and the frequent appeals and retrials that arise out of multiple represen-
tations. It can and will be argued that separate counsel should be required in spite of
the client's wishes. A constitutional remedy is singularly inappropriate to achieving
such an end.-
6. Though judicially prescribed rules mandating separate counsel are both ap-
propriate and more effective than a constitutional solution, see note 5 supra, in dealing
with problems of multiple representation, such rules themselves raise significant
problems. First of all, unless the prohibition is absolute, the problem will continue to
arise and the courts will be faced with the arduous task of dealing with the exceptions.
But courts are understandably and justifiably reluctant to promulgate absolute pro-
hibitions on their own volition. Second, courts can influence practice only before them
or before lower courts within their control. Thus judicial rulemaking will inevitably
produce a rather disconcerting crazy-quilt pattern of standards. Finally, and perhaps
most important, it is both unfair and unwise to thrust upon the courts sole responsi-
bility for regulating what are essentially the ethics of the practicing bar. This the bar
should do for itself.
1978]
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to conflicts of interest in multiple representation lies not in constitu-
tional principle or judicial rulemaking, but in a practicing bar more
concerned with an effective, fair, and efficient judicial system than
with the narrow self-interest of themselves and their clients. The
remainder of this Article represents an effort to demonstrate these
assertions.
I. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. POINT OF EMBARKATION: Glasser v. United States
The Supreme Court of the United States has only once consid-
ered the effect of an attorney's divided loyalties on the sixth amend-
ment rights of those accused of a crime.7 In Glasser v. United States,
five defendants were prosecuted for conspiracy to defraud the United
States. Prior to trial, defendant Kretske informed the court that he
was not satisfied with his attorney. The court requested that Stewart,
Glasser's attorney, undertake Kretske's defense as well, but both
Glasser and Stewart objected, maintaining that potential conflicts
existed. Subsequently, however, Stewart informed the court that he
would undertake to represent both Glasser and Kretske. Glasser said
nothing, and the court allowed the trial to proceed on that basis.
Glasser, Kretske, and their three codefendants were subsequently
convicted. On appeal, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Murphy, examined the trial record and found sufficient indication
that counsel's representation of Glasser was "not as effective as it
might have been if the appointment [of Stewart to represent
Kretske] had not been made."' Specifically, the failure of Glasser's
lawyer to cross-examine a prosecution witness adequately and his
failure to object to other evidence, arguably inadmissible against
Glasser, were held to be sufficient manifestations of a conflict of
interest to render Glasser's legal assistance constitutionally defec-
tive. 0
Lamentably the Glasser opinion lacks clarity on the issue, cen-
tral to sixth amendment interpretation, of whether a finding of preju-
dice, in addition to demonstrable conflict, is necessary to sustain the
7. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in another case involving
multiple representation and alleged sixth amendment violations. See Holloway v,
Arkansas, 430 U.S. 965 (1977) (No. 76-5856), granting cert. to 260 Ark. 250, 539 S.W.2d
435 (1976).
8. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
9. Id. at 76.
10. See id. at 73; note 22 infra. The Court set aside Glasser's conviction and
remanded for a new trial. 315 U.S. at 87-88.
[Vol. 62:119
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constitutional claim. Although the Court did not elaborate on such a
requirement in reversing Glasser's conviction," it refused to reverse
the conviction of Kretske, a coconspirator, absent a showing that he
had been prejudiced. 12 This ambiguity, along with dicta susceptible
to competing interpretations,' 3 has given rise to varying sixth
amendment standards. Though all courts require that a conflict or
at least a significant possibility of conflict bc shown to have existed,
some courts hold that this alone is sufficient to establish a sixth
amendment violation" while others require that it be coupled with
potential 5 or even demonstrable prejudice."
11. See 315 U.S. at 75-76; note 13 infra.
12. But this error [as to Glasser] does not require that the convictions
of the other petitioners be set aside. To secure a new trial they must show
that the denial of Glasser's constitutional rights prejudiced them in some
manner, for where error as to one defendant in a conspiracy case requires that
a new trial be granted him, the rights of his co-defendants to a new trial
depend upon whether that error prejudiced them.
315 U.S. at 76-77.
13. Some of the dicta in Glasser strongly suggest that a demonstrated conflict
of interest is, itself, an infirmity of constitutional dimension: "[It is] clear that the
'assistance of counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such
assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer
shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests." Id. at 70. This language has been
quoted by various appellate tribunals in support of the proposition that a conflict of
interest, without more, constitutes a denial of the sixth amendment rights of the
accused. See, e.g., People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 775, 447 P.2d 106, 111-12, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 10, 15-16- (1968).
Other dicta in Glasser can be interpreted as eliminating the necessity for any
inquiry into the prejudice suffered by an accused as a result of a conflict of interest:
To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by Glasser as a
result of the Court's appointment of Stewart [Glasser's retained counsel]
as counsel for Kretske is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have
the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to
indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its
denial.
315 U.S. at 75-76 (emphasis added). The quoted language presupposes, however, that
the accused has been prejudiced by the conflict in some degree.
14. See, e.g., Austin v. Erickson, 477 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Gougis, 374 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1967); Hall v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 304, 217 N.W.2d 352
(1974).
Some courts appear to use the terms "prejudice" and "conflict of interest" inter-
changeably. See, e.g., United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1055 (2d Cir. 1976);
Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
15. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1966); Craig v. United
States, 217 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1954).
16. See, e.g., Haggard v. Alabama, 550 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977); United States
v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973); Watkins v. Wilson, 408 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.
1969); Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
964 (1969); White v. United States, 396 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v.
1978]
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In fact, Glasser should be interpreted as advancing a principle
akin to the harmless error rule.'" The Court pointedly noted the
tenuous nature of the Government's case against Glasser and the
significance of that fact vis-a-vis his constitutional contentions:
Admittedly, the case against Glasser is not a strong one. The
Government frankly concedes that the case with respect to Glasser
"depends in large part . . . upon a development and collocation
of circumstances tending to sustain the inferences necessary to sup-
port the verdict." This is significant in relation to Glasser's conten-
tion that he was deprived of the assistance of counsel contrary to the
Sixth Amendment. 8
The Court then proceeded to articulate what appears to be the
basis for distinguishing Glasser's case from that of Kretske:
In all cases the constitutional safeguards are to be jealously pre-
served for the benefit of the accused, but especially is this true where
the scales of justice may be delicately poised between guilt and
innocence. Then error, which under some circumstances would not
be ground for reversal, cannot be brushed aside as immaterial, since
there is a real chance that it might have provided the slight impetus
which swung the scales toward guilt."
In concluding that the violation of Glasser's sixth amendment
rights required a new trial, the Court also stated that the undiluted
loyalty of defense counsel is particularly significant in the context of
a conspiracy trial:20
In conspiracy cases, where the liberal rules of evidence and the wide
latitude accorded the prosecution may, and sometimes do, operate
Burkeen, 355 F.2d 241 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 957 (1966).
Glasser has also prompted conflicting interpretations by commentators. See, e.g..
Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CoaRNEL L. Rxv. 1077, 1108 (1973) (specific
prejudice need not be shown); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as
a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 289, 334
(1964) (a generalized demonstration of prejudice must be made); Note, Criminal Code-
fendants and the Sixth Amendment: The Case for Separate Counsel, 58 GEo. L.J. 369,
387 (1969) (prejudice need not be proven).
17. Several courts have adopted a rule in the context of multiple representation
cases that incorporates the harmless error standard articulated by the Supreme Court
in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See, e.g., Lollar v. United States. 376
F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967); People v. DeShannon, 11 Cal. App. 3d 982, 90 Cal. Rptr.
300 (1970) (error harmless), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 (1971); People v. Gallardo, 269
Cal. App. 2d 86, 74 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1969) (error not harmless).
18. 315 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added).
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. One court has noted more recently that cautious practice should lead to
separate counsel in conspiracy cases "where the very nature of the charge suggests the
desirability of disassociation." Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071, 1073 (10th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 964 (1969).
[Vol. 62:119
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unfairly against an individual defendant, it is especially important
that he be given the benefit of the undivided assistance of his coun-
sel without the court's becoming a party to encumbering that assis-
tance.
21
Thus, in view of the nature of the charge against Glasser and the
gossamer-like fabric of the Government's case, the diluted loyalty of
counsel was prejudicial. By contrast, the conduct of counsel actually
favored Kretske,2 and the Court did not find the attorney's divided
allegiance inherently prejudicial to him. Kretske was therefore re-
quired to prove prejudice, and he failed to do so. The Court's mode
of analysis clearly indicates that a conflict of interest, although viola-
tive of the constitutional rights of the accused, may not require rever-
sal in all cases. A showing of prejudice is also required."
B. CONFLCTS IN CONTEXT
A conflict of interest may surface at one or more stages of a
criminal proceeding and in various aspects of trial representation.
Although state and lower federal courts have been somewhat incon-
sistent in applying the rule of Glasser to conflicts situations,2 their
decisions are useful for isolating those areas in which conflicts de-
velop.
1. Pleas and Plea Bargaining
Plea-bargaining is such a pervasive practices that experience and
skill in that context are as important to the criminal defense function
as courtroom advocacy. When one attorney represents multiple de-
fendants, however, plea bargain negotiations are fraught with danger
of conflicts of interest. For example, where an attorney represents two
clients, one of whom is substantially more culpable than the other,
he may forego altogether an attempt to bargain for the less culpable
defendant out of a fear that the defendant's cooperation with the
prosecution may undermine the defense of his more culpable client.
Similarly, a prosecutor may be willing to bargain with only one
defendant, promising a lesser sentence in exchange for testimony
21. 315 U.S. at 76.
22. The Court specifically noted that counsel's failure to cross-examine a prose-
cution witness fully was probably motivated by a desire to protect Kretske. Id. at 73.
23. Despite its admonitions against indulging in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from impairment of effective assistance of counsel, see id.
at 75-76, the Glasser court itself engaged in a detailed analysis of the nature of the
alleged offense and the sufficiency of the evidence against each petitioner, see id. at
77-83.
24. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
25. See generally Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971).
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against codefendants. A deal offered to one defendant and not to
others places counsel in an untenable position. If he deems the gov-
ernment's offer to be in the best interests of the defendant and ad-
vises him to accept it, he may later confront that defendant as a
prosecution witness at trial."8 Recognizing this potential detriment to
the interests of other defendants, the attorney may be inclined to
dissuade him from accepting the proffered bargain. But if his advice
to one defendant is influenced by concern for other defendants, the
lawyer suffers an impairment of loyalty violative of the former's sixth
amendment rights."
Even where the government is willing to negotiate with all defen-
dants, the spectre of a deal that works to the detriment of one or more
of them remains. For example, the prosecutor may be amenable to a
lesser sentence for some defendants if the "more culpable" defen-
dants plead guilty to more serious charges. The result may be that
one or more of the defendants will be the sacrificial lambs of a pack-
age deal. Again, counsel's loyalties are irreparably divided. To further
the interests of some defendants, others must be convinced to ac-
quiesce. In such cases, the guilty pleas of one or more of the defen-
dants may be held to have been involuntarily entered.28
Notwithstanding the importance of plea negotiations, the terms
and circumstances of a plea bargain may often be totally or partially
obscured from appellate review. In federal cases, the court must re-
quire disclosure of a plea bargain in open court.2 In many states,
however, the factors that counsel takes into account in determining
the desirability of a plea bargain are unlikely to appear in the trial
record. In fact, the nature of the agreement itself may not be dis-
closed.
Whether or not a bargain is struck with the prosecution, there is
significant pressure on the attorney to keep his clients' pleas consis-
tent with each other despite potential differences in their situations.
For example, if one defendant pleads guilty and implicates a codefen-
dant who pleads not guilty, the attorney is in an unenviable position.
26. Representation of a defendant who becomes a prosecution witness against
another client-defendant involves a clear conflict of interest. See United States v
Mahar, 550 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256
(7th Cir. 1975) (possible conflict of interest where government witness had previously
been represented by defense counsel's firm), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976); Com-
monwealth v. Geraway, 364 Mass. 168, 301 NE.2d 814 (1973).
27. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Wainwright, 522 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1975). Even in the
absence of a sixth amendment violation, counsel may be in violation of ethical
duties. See notes 100-50 infra and accompanying text.
28. See United States v. Truglio, 493 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1974). See generally
Holland v. Boles, 225 F. Supp. 863 (N.D.W.Va. 1963).
29. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
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As an advocate for both, counsel is obliged simultaneously to seek a
minimal sentence on behalf of the defendant who pleads guilty and
to attack his credibility on behalf of the codefendant. In such situa-
tions, courts have found little difficulty in concluding that the inter-
ests of the defendants are antagonistic."
2. Inconsistent Defenses
Conflicts may also develop between the interests of defendants
when, although their pleas are consistent, their defenses are not.
Assume, for example, that defendant A claims that at the time of the
alleged offense he was in the company of defendant B and others.
Defendant B's defense, on the other hand, is that he was in the
company of others, but that defendant A was not present. In this
case, a lawyer representing both A and B is placed in the anomalous
position of attacking the credibility of one client to further the inter-
ests of the other. Whenever one defendant incriminates or impairs the
defense of a codefendant, a clear conflict of interest exists that ren-
ders trial advocacy constitutionally defective.3
30. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1966) (one defendant
confessed and implicated a codefendant); People v. Ware, 39 Ill. 2d 66, 233 N.E.2d 421
(1968); People v. LaMere, 39 App. Div. 2d 15,331 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1972); Moran v. State,
4 Tenn. Crim. App. 399,472 S.W.2d 238 (1971). Under a so-called "prophylactic rule,"
inconsistent pleas have been held to create a per se conflict of interest. See Common-
wealth-v. Dawud, 218 Pa. Super. Ct. 291, 275 A.2d 686 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Werner, 217 Pa. Super. Ct. 49, 268 A.2d 195 (1970). Other courts, however, have looked
beyond the pleadings to determine whether a guilty plea by one defendant actually
incriminates any codefendants. See, e.g., United States v. Moose, 424 F.2d 276 (4th
Cir. 1970); State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho 124, 438 P.2d 275 (1968); Loftis v. State, 433
S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Crim. 1968); State v. Kennedy, 8 Wash. App. 633. 508 P.2d 1386
(1973).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1976); United
States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973); White v. United States, 396 F.2d 822
(5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Gougis, 374 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1967); State v. Bush,
108 Ariz. 148, 493 P.2d 1205 (1972); Commonwealth ex reL Whitling v. Russell, 406
Pa. 45, 176 A.2d 641 (1962).
A related conflict of interest problem arises when one defendant makes a pretrial
confession implicating other defendants represented by the same attorney. If the con-
fessing defendant does not testify at trial, his extrajudicial confession will be inadmis-
sible because of the implicated codefendant's sixth amendment right to confront wit-
nesses. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). If the confessing defendant
testifies, however, and affirms his prior statement, counsel is not only obliged to cross-
examine him fully but also to protect his interests and preserve his confidences. See
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBmY DR 4-101. If the attorney exercises restraint
in cross-examination to avoid areas of confidential communication, his cross-
examination may be constitutionally defective. Cf. State v. Coleman, 9 Ariz. App. 526,
454 P.2d 196 (1969) (counsel did not adequately cross-examine defendant who denied
pretrial confession).
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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In general, conflicts stemming from inconsistent pleas or defen-
ses will be readily apparent to a trial judge or reviewing court from
the conduct of counsel.32 A much less evident conflict of interest may
develop, however, when defenses available to a defendant are not
asserted. If a defense is available to one defendant, but not to an-
other, or if it would conflict with the defense of another, the attorney
might seek to avoid weakening the defense of the latter by imposing
an enforced harmony of defenses for the benefit of all defendants,
rather than asserting a separate defense for each. What may then
emerge is a collective defense with no appearance of inconsistency on
the trial record. As a result, one defendant is deprived of a potentially
meritorious defense solely because of the multiple representation.
A "lost" defense of this kind is easily asserted on appeal but
difficult to prove. From the perspective of an appellate tribunal, the
possibility that other defenses might have been raised is highly specu-
lative and difficult to assess on the basis of a trial record. For this
reason, a number of courts have found allegations of lost defenses
insufficient to demonstrate a deprivation of constitutional rights.3" In
cases where an assertible defense is obvious to the reviewing court,
but conspicuously absent from the trial record, the detriment to the
defendant may be plain enough to warrant a finding of constitution-
ally inadequate representation. 4 But in less blatant cases, counsel's
failure to assert a potentially beneficial defense may be a dear and
unanticipated cost of multiple representation.
Some courts have f6und that such a conflict of interest can be "cured" if a defen-
dant who makes a pretrial statement incriminating a codefendant later denies the
truth of the statement on the witness stand. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Morgan
v. Keve, 425 F. Supp. 585 (D. Del. 1976). The interests of codefendants will not be in
conflict if their defenses are different, but not mutually exclusive. See, e.g., United
States v. Lovano, 420 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1071 (1970); People
v. Sanchez, 2 Cal. App. 3d 467, 82 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1969).
32. As a practical matter, even readily apparent conflicts may not arise or be
reasonably anticipated at the beginning of trial. See text following note 97 infra. But
if a conflict of interest becomes apparent after trial is underway, the adversarial pro-
cess will be compromised, and the trial judge would invite reversible error by per-
mitting counsel to continue representing defendants in combative positions.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972); United States
v. Sheiner, 410 F.2d 337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825 (1969).
34. In Austin v. Erickson, 477 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1973), Austin and her boyfriend,
Goode, were charged with first degree manslaughter in the death of Austin's infant son.
Although the child died as a result of being throttled by Goode while Austin was out
of the house, the attorney who represented both defendants failed to assert the defense
of lack of responsiblity on behalf of Austin. Austin's legal representation at trial was
held constitutionally defective. Id. at 626.
In similar circumstances, other courts have arrived at the same conclusion. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973); People v.
Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 447 P.2d 106, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1968); People v. Littleton, 25
Cal. App. 3d 96, 101 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1972); People v. Ramsey, 17 Cal. App. 3d 731, 95
Cal. Rptr. 231 (1971).
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3. Defendants as Witnesses
In each criminal trial, defense counsel must make a strategic
judgment as to whether the defendant should take the witness stand
in his own defense. A variety of considerations must be taken into
account, including the substantive content of the defendant's poten-
tial statements, the weight and sufficiency of the government's evi-
dence, the probable demeanor of the defendant on the witness stand,
and the vulnerability of the defendant to impeachment. The decision
to put a defendant on the witness stand or to advise against testifying
is doubtless'one of the criminal trial lawyer's most crucial decisions.?
As a matter of trial strategy, this decision is further complicated
when defense counsel represents multiple defendants.
The anticipated content of a defendant's testimony may be ei-
ther detrimental or beneficial to codefendants. For example, a defen-
dant's testimony might serve to exonerate him but implicate a code-
fendant. The lawyer is therefore faced with a choice between the
conflicting interests of two clients and may advise against testifying
to eliminate potentially inconsistent defenses from the trial record.
Alternatively, a defendant may wish to take the stand and admit the
offense charged, exonerating the codefendant. If separately repre-
sented, the defendant's proposal would probably be vigorously op-
posed by his lawyer, but in the multiple representation situation,
opposition might be less vigorous, in view of the obvious benefit to
the codefendant. In either case, defective assistance of counsel is an
obvious danger, yet it may be difficult to discern on appeal.,
Aside from the anticipated content of a defendant's statements,
other factors that the attorney must consider as relevant to the ad-
visability of testifying may also weigh differently for different defen-
dants. One defendant may be more susceptible to impeachment than
another;3' similarly, one defendant's demeanor may be likely to con-
35. At least in some cases, and perhaps in many, the failure of the defendant to
take the witness stand may prove fatal to his case because of the unfavorable inferences
likely to be drawn by the trier of fact. See 2 J. WamusTF, EvtDENcE 404[041, at 404-
27 (1975); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2272, at 426 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
36. But see People v. Karlin, 231 Cal. App. 2d 227, 41 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1964)
(appellant who admitted offense and exonerated codefendant was deprived of constitu-
tional right to adequate legal representation); State v. Sullivan, 210 Kan. 842, 504 P.2d
190 (1972).
37. For example, defendantA may have made prior inconsistent statements that
can be used to impeach his present version of the facts, while defendant B made no
prior statements. Similarly, defendant A may have made an inadmissible confession,
while defendant B remained silent, at the time of police interrogation. Even if the
confession is inadmissible for substantive purposes, it may be introduced to impeach
the credibility of the confessing defendant if he testifies at trial. See Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Differences in prior criminal records between one defendant
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vey an impression of truthfulness to the trier of fact, while another's
might have the opposite effect. In such cases, counsel is faced with
a difficult determination. He must evaluate the overall impact of
each defendant's testimony, taking into account both positive and
negative factors. Given the differences that will inevitably exist be-
tween his clients, the lawyer may well determine that it is strategi-
cally undesirable for one defendant to testify but beneficial, and per-
haps necessary, for another to do so.
The decision to advise one client to testify and another to remain
silent is not without attendant problems, however. If, for example,
only one of an attorney's two clients takes the witness stand, the
lawyer must contend with the inevitable question in the minds of the
jurors as to why the other defendant refused to testify. Although it is
constitutionally impermissible for the court or counsel to comment
on the defendant's refusal to testify, the jury may infer that the
defendant who remains silent has something to hide. 8 Perhaps even
more damaging, a subtle impression may be conveyed to the jury that
the defendants' own lawyer finds significant differences between
them. The prejudicial impact may be almost inescapable."
In order to avert unfavorable inferences by the jury, defense
and another may also influence defense counsel's decision to advise the defendant to
testify because a substantial criminal record may be employed by the prosecutor to
impair a defendant's credibility.
38. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965).
39. For a defense attorney to convey to the trier of fact, even by implication, the
impression that one of his clients is more culpable than another may have disastrous
consequences. See Freedman, supra note 3, at 1471-72:
Criminal defense lawyers do not win their cases by arguing reasonable doubt.
Effective trial advocacy requires that the attorney's every word, action and
attitude be consistent with the conclusion that his client is innocent. As
every trial lawyer knows, the jury is certain that the defense attorney knows
whether his client is guilty. The jury is therefore alert to, and will be enor-
mously affected by, any indication by the attorney that he believes the
defendant to be guilty.
Even if this pitfall is avoided, counsel's decision whether his clients should testify will
still be fraught with dangers of prejudice. See Morgan v. United States, 396 F.2d 110,
114 (2d Cir. 1968):
This kind of decision, difficult enough where two defendants at the same trial
are represented by different counsel, is made doubly difficult where they are
represented by the same counsel. The decision whether a defendant should
testify may be unduly affected by the risk that his testimony may develop
so as to disclose matters which are harmful to the other defendant or which
conflict with the other defendant's story. The attorney's freedom to cross-
examine one defendant on behalf of another will be restricted where the
attorney represents both defendants. And if, where two defendants are repre-
sented by the same attorney, one defendant elects to take the stand and the
other chooses not to, the possible prejudice in the eyes of the jury to the
defendant who does not take the stand is almost inescapable.
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counsel may choose either of two options. First, he may refrain from
putting either client on the stand. In this case, the jury would not look
askance at the nontestifying defendant, but the other defendant
would be deprived of the potential benefits of testifying. In other
words, the interests of the more vulnerable defendant would become
the common cause of both defendants. Alternatively, the lawyer
might advise both clients to testify. In this case, the defendant whose
credibility, demeanor, or substantive statements would tend to dam-
age his defense would suffer a detriment because of the collective
advocacy.
Appellate decisions construing the sixth amendment have
evinced no uniformity on this aspect of inadequate legal representa-
tion." Nevertheless, it should be apparent that a single legal repre-
sentative of multiple defendants too often may be compelled to
choose between the interests of one client and another. The existence
of such a choice evidences an impairment of counsel's independent
professional judgment, however subtle the impairment and however
difficult to discern on appeal.
4. Evidence Prbffered by the Prosecution
Not all evidence introduced by the government will be equally
incriminating to all defendants in multiple defendant cases. When a
witness for the prosecution gives testimony incriminating only one of
defense counsel's clients, counsel must tread a perilous path. He
must vigorously question the witness' testimony and credibility on
behalf of the client against whom it is offered. To best serve the
interests of other defendants, however, he should also underscore the
fact that the testimony does not relate to or implicate those defen-
dants. By doing so, the lawyer may implicitly highlight the incrimi-
nating nature of the testimony as to the defendant against whom it
is offered. To avoid, this negative implication, defense counsel may
simply refrain from distinguishing among his clients. The failure to
40. In some cases the existence of pretrial statements by one defendant but not
by another has been held to produce a conflict of interest. See, e.g., People v. Donohoe.
200 Cal.'App. 2d 17, 19 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1962). In other instances, substantial differences
in the criminal records of multiple defendants have been held to impair counsel's
obligation of undivided loyalty to each defendant. See, e.g., People v. Douglas, 61 Cal.
2d 430, 392 P.2d 964, 38 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1964); People v. Gallardo, 269 Cal. App. 2d
86, 74 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1969). A defense advocate's decision as to which of the defen-
dants should take the witness stand has not always been held to constitute reversible
error, however, despite -disparities in the criminal record of each. See, e.g., Fryar v.
United States, 404 F.2d 1071, 1074 (10th Cir. 1968) (conflict of interest contention
found to be "subjective speculation"), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 964 (1969); People v.
DeShannon, 11 Cal. App. 3d 982, 90 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1970) (actual conflict constituted
harmless error under the circumstances), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 (1971).
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draw such distinctions exhibits a division of loyalty that violates the
sixth amendment.4'
Defense counsel must confront a similar problem when evidence
is admissible against one defendant but not another. The advocate
may be reluctant to object to the admissibility of evidence proffered
against one defendant because of the negative implication that might
be created against another defendant. Failure to make timely objec-
tions or request limiting instructions as to the admissibility of such
evidence has been held to evince a violation of the sixth amendment
rights of a defendant.2 A limiting instruction given by the trial court
sua sponte has been held to alleviate the conflict of interest, 3 but in
fact such an instruction eliminates only an indicium of the conflict,
not the conflict itself."
5. Closing Argument
The defense counsel's summation at the close of a criminal trial
is his last and perhaps best opportunity to influence the deliberations
of the jury. In preparing a closing argument, the attorney must con-
sider the weight and sufficiency of the evidence against the defendant
to determine what matters to emphasize. In a multiple defendant
case, a lawyer who represents only one defendant may take advantage
of favorable comparisons between his client and other defendants by
pointing out the greater weight of evidence against the others. When
multiple defendants are represented by a single attorney, however,
counsel must approach comparisons among defendants with the ut-
most caution, and the greater the difference in evidence against each
defendant, the more serious is counsel's problem.
For example, the evidence introduced against one defendant
may be insubstantial and replete with potentially reasonable doubts,
but emphasis upon its weaknesses may create an adverse implication
that the government's case against other defendants is stronger. The
trier of fact may draw the inference that defense counsel himself
41. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). Other courts have
expressed divergent views. Compare Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355 (6th Cir.
1954) (holding that cross-examination that fails to highlight the differences among
multiple defendants manifests a constitutionally impermissible conflict of interest),
with United States v. Gallagher, 437 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.) (holding that a similar
constitutional claim involved matters of trial strategy too speculative for redress), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 1009 (1971).
42. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 73-76 (1942).
43. See, e.g., Watkins v. Wilson, 408 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1969).
44. In Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942), the Court's purported
refusal to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice sustained by
Glasser may have been an implicit recognition that it is unlikely that all consequences
of a conflict of interest will be evident from the trial record.
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believes that the government has a substantially better case against
the other defendants. Thus, the spectre of these negative implica-
tions may cause counsel to forego the opportunity to highlight weak-
nesses in the government's case. Defense lawyers who have chosen
this approach have been held to have rendered constitutionally de-
ficient legal assistance.'5 Where weaknesses in the evidentiary show-
ing against a defendant are not glaring and omissions in closing argu-
ments are not blatant, however, convictions may well survive appel-
late review. 6
Alternatively, a defense lawyer may attempt to avoid conflicts
by using his summation to comment fully on all the evidence pro-
duced at trial. In doing so, he may differentiate between the defen-
dants, consciously or unconsciously making statements detrimental
to one of his clients. Thus, he may convey to the jury the impression
that the evidence is stronger against, and justifies the conviction of,
one of the persons he is trying to serve. Closing arguments that are
actually detrimental to a defendant's cause are more consistent with
the prosecutorial than the defense function. In such cases, an actual
conflict of interest is apparent in the record and has been held to
violate the affected defendant's constitutional rights."
45. See, e.g., Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1965):
The problems inherent in joint representation are illustrated in this
case. Defense counsel stated that he had virtually ignored Glenmore and
"unwittingly . . . made all comments with reference to the Defendant
Campbell." In his argument to the jury, defense counsel did not once men-
tion the special problems presented by the case against Glenmore ...
Furthermore, defense counsel made no effort to dissociate Glenmore from
Campbell, against whom the Government presented a strong case.
See also Sanchez v. Nelson, 446 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1971).
46. Disparities in the weight and sufficiency of evidence against multiple defen-
dants arguably produce some degree of conflict in every case. A significant number
of appellate courts have stated, however, that such circumstances are not, without
more, violative of defendant's sixth amendment rights. See, e.g., United States v.
Mandell, 525 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976); United States
v. Miller, 463 F.2d 600 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 956 (1972); United States ex
reL Ross v. LaVallee, 448 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Gallagher, 437
F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1009 (1971); Englehart v. Commonwealth,
353 Mass. 561, 233 N.E.2d 737, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 886 (1968); Holloway v. State.
32 Wis. 2d 559, 146 N.W.2d 441 (1966). To hold otherwise would, as a practical mat.
ter, require appellate tribunals to find sixth amendment violations whenever two
defendants of unequal culpability were represented by the same counsel. See United
States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671, 678 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Olsen, 453 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 927 (1972); State v. Cox, 109 Ariz. 144, 506 P.2d 1038 (1973); People v. Keesee,
250 Cal. App. 2d 794, 58 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1967).
1978]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
6. Sentencing
In many jurisdictions, evidence may be admitted solely for the
purpose of establishing an appropriate sentence for convicted defen-
dants. 8 Defense counsel is given an opportunity to introduce and
argue matters personal to the defendant that would otherwise be
irrelevant to the merits of the criminal case. In such cases, compari-
sons between defendants are not simply a matter of preferred trial
strategy but are vital to the interests of convicted defendants.'" Fac-
tors such as a defendant's character, age, criminal record, military
service, employment history, and cooperation with police, although
not germane to guilt or innocence, may strongly influence sentenc-
ing, 0 particularly when contrasted to the characteristics of the other
defendants. Furthermore, a showing that a defendant took a lesser
role in commission of the crime, or was merely a follower in criminal
activity, may also prove beneficial."
In this phase of a criminal proceeding the interests of multiple
defendants will almost invariably diverge. Few criminal acts are com-
mitted by persons whose participation in the planning and commis-
sion of the offense is identical. Nor are many convicted defendants
likely to possess identical or substantially similar backgrounds. Even
when the hazards of multiple representation have been scrupulously
avoided throughout trial, any unity of interests among multiple de-
fendants almost inevitably deteriorates at the sentencing stage. To
illustrate, assume that defendants A and B have been convicted of
aggravated assault. Defendant A, age 42, has been convicted of two
prior criminal offenses, robbery and assault with a deadly weapon.
Defendant B, however, is twenty years old with only a juvenile rec-
ord. In representing defendant B, counsel would attempt to assert
that defendant B deserves a lesser sentence than the older and more
experienced defendant. If one attorney represents both defendants,
however, this argument is likely to be avoided.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972); United States
v. Schipani, 315 F.Supp. 253, 255-56 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1).
49. See generally text preceding note 56 infra.
50. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949); Humes v. United
States, 186 F.2d 875, 878 (10th Cir. 1951) (character); Commonwealth v. Green, 396
Pa. 137, 146-50, 151 A.2d 241, 246-48 (1959) (age and other mitigating factors); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Murray v. Ashe, 149 Pa. Super. Ct. 22, 24, 26 A.2d 217, 218 (1942)
(cooperation with police). See generally J. WILLAMs, THE Law OF SENTENCING AND
CORRECTIONS 17-18 (1974); see also United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1234-37
(2d Cir. 1974) (perjury during trial considered in sentencing), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
897 (1975).
51. See generally Case v. North Carolina, 315 F.2d 743 (4th Cir. 1963).
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Appellate tribunals have not been unmindful of these difficul-
ties.52 In cases where counsel has, in effect, played one client off
against another by sacrificing the interests of one in an attempt to
secure lesser punishment for the other, the courts have ruled that the
sixth amendment rights of the adversely affected defendant were
violated.53 On the other hand, the failure of counsel to draw distinc-
tions between defendants for the purpose of sentencing has also been
held to deprive a convicted defendant of the effective assistance of
counsel.51
C. CONFLICTS AND APPELLATE REVIEW
From the foregoing, two points should be apparent. First, the
possibility of a defense lawyer being called upon to make choices
between the interests of one client and another looms at every stage
of a criminal proceeding. In mapping out a trial strategy that ad-
vances the best interests of each defendant, the attorney must be ever
cognizant of defenses and strategies that may impair the position of
the others. Differences in the weight and sufficiency of the evidence
against the defendants may produce less than zealous advocacy on
behalf of one of the accused. Differences in the demeanor and per-
sonal background of defendants may provoke even more subtle im-
pairments of counsel's assistance. The greater the number of defen-
dants simultaneously represented by a single attorney, the greater
52. In a frequently quoted opinion, the California Supreme Court held that a
conflict of interest necessarily exists when a jury must fix the penalty for more than
one defendant. The court stated,
He [defense counsel] cannot simultaneously argue with any semblance of
effectiveness that each defendant is most deserving of the lesser penalty.
Moreover, the conflict is not limited to the trial on the issue of penalty, for
normally the same jury determines both the issue of guilt and the issue of
penalty. Counsel must therefore conduct the defense throughout the entire
trial to stress evidence and considerations to support the lesser penalty.
Counsel appointed to represent more than one defendant when the jury
must fix the penalty for each is forced ... to treat his clients as a group
and to abandon arguments which would apply to each separately.
People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 775, 447 P.2d 106, 112, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 16 (1968)
(emphasis added). Accord, Case v. North Carolina, 315 F.2d 743 (4th Cir. 1963).
53. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thompson v. Rundle, 294 F. Supp. 933 (E.D.
Pa. 1968); State v. Karston, 247 Iowa 32, 72 N.W.2d 463 (1955); Commonwealth v.
Bracey, 224 Pa. Super. 294, 307 A.2d 320 (1973); Commonwealth v. Cullen, 216 Pa.
Super. 23, 260 A.2d 818 (1969); Hall v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 304, 217 N.W.2d 352 (1974).
But see Hess v. State, 4 Md. App. 508, 243 A.2d 651 (1968). The withdrawal of defense
counsel prior to sentencing has been held to remove any prejudicial effect upon multi-
ple defendants. See, e.g., Bauckman v. State, 9 Md. App. 612, 267 A.2d 309 (1970).
54. See, e.g., People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 447 P.2d 106. 73 Cal. Rptr. 10
(1968); Commonwealth v. Cox, 441 Pa. 64, 270 A.2d 207 (1970). See generally Case v.
North Carolina,; 315 F.2d 743 (4th Cir. 1963).
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the possibility that conflicts will arise. In fact, in every case of multi-
ple representation, there exists a likelihood, if not a certainty, that
the strategic maneuvers of the criminal defense attorney will ad-
versely affect the interests of at least one defendant at some point in
the trial process.55
In this context, it is appropriate to note another danger inhering
in multiple representation cases that is present at every stage of the
trial: the perhaps irrational notion of guilt by association. A lawyer
who represents one defendant in a multiple defendant trial will gener-
ally take pains to disassociate his client from the others. For a single
defense lawyer with multiple clients, such disassociation will be ex-
traordinarily difficult. The view from the jury box may be that birds
of a feather flock to the same lawyer. When multiple defendants are
represented by the same lawyer, they may be perceived as a group
defendant and may survive or perish depending upon the effective-
ness of common denominator defenses advanced by their collective
counsel. In drawing legal distinctions among defendants, a jury sim-
ply may not be reliable.56
Appellate review of the constitutional adequacy of legal assis-
tance does not fully safeguard the interests of jointly represented
defendants. When a sixth amendment violation is alleged, the appel-
late tribunal must scrutinize the trial conduct of the appellant's
counsel. If the court finds a divergence from accepted principles of
criminal trial advocacy vis-A-vis one defendant that is causally re-
lated to the advancement of the interests of another defendant, a
constitutionally impermissible conflict will be held to exist.5 This
manner of review indicates that, although courts periodically state
that inquiry into the strategies of a trial lawyer is beyond the scope
of appellate review, 8 exactly that sort of inquiry will inevitably be
the basis of their sixth amendment scrutiny."
55. See, e.g., People v. Odom, 236 Cal. App. 2d 876, 878-79, 46 Cal. Rptr. 453,
454-55 (1965) (enumerating several situations in which conflicts of interest are likely
to arise); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECTrrION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 213-
14 (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS] (describing
various situations in which multiple representation may involve conflicts of interest).
56. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (substantial risk that jury
relied upon confession admissible only against codefendant in establishing defendant's
guilt); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (danger that evidence of defendant's guilt
will influence jury's finding on question of voluntariness of confession).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1976).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972).
59. In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the United States Supreme
Court described the caliber of legal representation required by the sixth amendment
as "reasonably competent," id. at 770, and "advice ... within the range of compe-
tence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases," id. at 771. Cf. United States ex rel.
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In many cases, however, a criminal defendant undertakes a diffi-
cult if not impossible task in attempting to establish that a selected
trial strategy resulted from the conflicting interests served by his
lawyer." A criminal trial inevitably bears the mark of the defense
attorney involved since two experienced criminal trial lawyers are
likely to try the same case differently. Thus, differences in trial
strategy, even though erroneous or ineffective when viewed retro-
spectively, are not necessarily tantamount to constitutionally ineffec-
tive assistance. Absent a demonstration of conflict by the appellant,
an appellate court may refuse to speculate as to the reasons for a cer-
tain trial strategy, even though an alternative approach might have
proven more beneficial to the appellant.6 '
- Judicial reluctance to second-guess the motivation of defense
counsel is not without justification. In making such assessments,
appellate tribunals are faced with a cold record, from which they
must attempt to establish whether advocacy during a distant trial
was constitutionally deficient. Counsel may have made specific trial
judgments based in whole or in part upon facts and circumstances
that are not in the trial record and are entirely unrelated to a conflict
of interest. Even when a serious conflict of interest existed at trial,
impaired-advocacy may not be evident from a reading of the trans-
cript. Thus, after-the-fact reconstruction of trial strategy and the
reasons- therefor is exceedingly difficult, and judicial frustration in
attempting to make such determinations is apparent in many opin-
ions."'
Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973) (applying a standard of "normal
competency").
60. See, e.g.,-United States v. Kutas, 542 F.2d 527, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Wisniewski, 478 F.2d 274, 284-85 (2d Cir. 1973).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972); United States
v. Gallagher, 437 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1009 (1971). In Foster.
the Court noted,
Of course, Foster might have tried a very different line of defense under the
guidance of separate counsel, but this is merely to say that one lawyer may
try a case quite differently from another. The possibility here that another
approach might have been used, with better results for the defendant, exists
in every case and is very far indeed from making out a deprivation of consti-
tutional right.
469 F.2d at 4.
62. In Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court stated.
The obvious reason against insisting on a precise delineation of the prejudice
suffered is that such a task is made very difficult when one must rely on a
cold, printed record for reconstructon of the manifold and complex dynamics
of the trial process, including reasons for trial tactics which may have been
dictated by the joint representation. Like the famous tip of the iceberg, the
record may not reveal the whole story; apparently minor instances in the
1978]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Even if some evidence of the divided loyalties of counsel is appar-
ent from the record, the obstacles that a convicted defendant must
hurdle to obtain reversal are greater in some jurisdictions than others.
Varied interpretations of the Supreme Court's ambiguous decision in
Glasser account for much of this disparity."3 If the decision is cor-
rectly interpreted to embody a harmless error standard,6 the defen-
dant will be required to demonstrate both a conflict of interest and
prejudice to obtain reversal. 5 Regardless of the standard employed,
record which suggest co-defendants' conflicting interests may well be the
telltale signs of deeper conflict.
Id. at 246-47. See United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1972); Fryar v.
United States, 404 F.2d 1071, 1073 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 964 (1969);
United States ex rel. Miller v. Myers, 253 F. Supp. 55, 57 (E.D. Pa. 1966); People v.
Odom, 236 Cal. App. 2d 876, 880, 46 Cal. Rptr. 453, 455 (1965).
In view of the inherent limitations of appellate review, some courts have recog-
nized that an "informed speculation" of prejudice would justify reversal of a defen-
dant's conviction. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F,2d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 1973); Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Indeed,
Glasser itself required no more than demonstrable indicia of divided loyalties. See
notes 8-23 supra and accompanying text. But the necessity of reliance on a search of
the trial record to uncover such indicia only underscores the weakness of appellate
review of multiple representation cases because many of the detriments following from
an attorney's conflict of interest may be imperceptible in the record. See Austin v.
Erickson, 477 F.2d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 1973); People v. Gallardo, 269 Cal. App. 2d 86,
90, 74 Cal. Rptr. 572, 575 (1969); notes 25-54 supra and accompanying text. Moreover,
any determination of what will suffice as indicia of ineffective counsel is, at least in
part, the product of the appellate court's understanding of basic principles of trial
advocacy. It is at least notable that not all appellate judges were experienced trial
lawyers before assuming the bench, and they may, therefore, be ill-equipped to make
such a determination.
63. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text. Some courts have also drawn
a distinction between retained and appointed counsel. This distinction is based upon
the notion that the state is not an active participant in the selection of counsel when
a defendant freely selects a lawyer who also represents codefendants in the same
matter. Thus, state action does not exist, and the sixth amendment standard may not
be applied. See generally Alvarez v. Wainwright, 522 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1975). The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, has criticized the distinction:
A rule which would apply one fourteenth amendment test to assigned coun-
sel and another to retained counsel would produce the anomoly [sic that
the non-indigent, who must retain an attorney if he can afford one, would
be entitled to less protection from the trial court. The effect upon the defen-
dant-confinement as a result of an unfair state trial-is the same whether
the inadequate attorney was assigned or retained.
United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 1973). Other courts
have simply rejected the distinction altogether. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Robin-
son v. Housewright, 525 F.2d 988, 994 n.8 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Foster, 469
F.2d 1, 4 n.2 (1st Cir. 1972); Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 245-46 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355, 359 (6th Cir. 1954). See generally Waltz,
supra note 16, at 296-301.
64. See notes 17-23 supra and accompanying text.
65. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has relied upon
Supreme Court decisions on harmless error to shift to the government the burden of
[Vol. 62:119
MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION
however, an examination of results actually reached reveals that
some courts are less disposed to reversing convictions in multiple
representation cases than are others. For example, some courts con-
fronted with a record containing substantial or overwhelming evi-
dence against an appellant have concluded that defense counsel's
multiple representation did not result in a demonstrable conflict;"
others have rejected the notion that the substantiality of the govern-
ment's case renders a defendant's constitutional claim less compel-
lingY These disparities suggest that a defendant's fortunes in a sixth
amendment appeal may hinge, in large part, on the fortuity of a
sympathetic appeals court."
proving that the appellant's rights were not prejudicially affected. See, e.g., Lollar v.
United States, 376 F.2d 243, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (citing Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18 (1967)).
For the most part, however, harmless error is not discussed in multiple representa-
tion cases. In jurisdictions where prejudicial effect must be proven, courts have simply
concluded that constitutional error does not exist absent a showing of conflict and
prejudice. See, e.g., Haggard v. Alabama, 550 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977); United States
v. LaRiche, 549 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987 (1977); United States
v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973); Watkins v. Wilson, 408 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.
1969); Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
964 (1969); United States v. Burkeen, 355 F.2d 241 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
957 (1966). In other jurisdictions, a showing of actual prejudice is not required. See
notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela, 521 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1975). cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976). One eminent and outspoken judge has suggested that the
reluctance of some appellate courts to reverse for inadequate representation when
convictions are based on firm evidence may have a pragmatic underpinning:
It is the belief-raiely articulated, but, I am afraid, widely held-that most
criminal defendants are guilty anyway. . . .This may be an important rea-
son why appellate courts commonly require appellants to show not only that
their constitutional right to effective counsel was denied but also that the
denial was prejudicial.
Bazelon, supra note 3, at 26.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1057 (2d Cir. 1976) ("We
cannot accept the proposition that the more potent the Government's case, the less
compelling the criminal defendant's constitutional right to independent counsel.").
68. These differences in the significance that various courts attach to similar
factual situations may to some extent reflect their differing conceptions of the minimal
level of representational competence that can be tolerated consistent with the sixth
amendment.
For example, the Tenth Circuit consistently holds that trial representation satis-
fies sixth amendment competency requirements unless tantamount to a sham or pre-
tense, see, eg., United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.
Ct. 186 (1977); United States v. Dingle, 546 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1976), while the
Third Circuit holds that adequate representation in a constitutional sense requires
adherence to a normal competency standard, see, e.g., United States ex reL. Hart v.
Davenport, 478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle. 434
F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1970). Thus, when presented with a possible conflict in the context
of a multiple representation, a court's views on the degree of effectiveness required by
the sixth amendment may affect its willingness to find that the alleged conflict was of
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Finally, apart from problems of effectiveness, relying on appel-
late review to correct the problems of multiple representation is mis-
guided. Because of its retrospective, remedial view of the problem,
appellate review can do nothing to prevent the waste of judicial re-
sources and the burden on the parties made necessary by the appeal
and new trial."'
The inadequacy and inappropriateness of appellate review as a
remedy for conflicts of interest dictate that attempts be made to
resolve such questions at the trial level. The trial court is better
situated to discern the existence and effect of a conflict as well as the
defendants' appreciation of potential and actual conflicts. It is there-
fore appropriate to consider the effectiveness of measures that have
been employed to resolve conflicts at trial.
D. RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS AT TRIAL
1. Waiver
Since an accused may waive his right to protections guaranteed
by the Constitution, 0 a conflict of interest, although violative of a
defendant's sixth amendment rights, is subject to waiver.7 The trial
court, however, bears significant responsibility for safeguarding the
essential rights of the accused by ensuring that the waiver is voluntar-
ily and intelligently made with an awareness of relevant circum-
stances and likely consequences.7 2
At least some courts have recognized the difficulties involved in
obtaining an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights from a defen-
dant who lacks the sophistication to appreciate fully the significance
of such a waiver.72 A waiver will be ineffective unless the defendant
fully understands the manifold circumstances in which a conflict may
develop. A generalized admonition by the trial court that counsel's
duties to one client may conflict with duties to another is hardly
sufficient magnitude to constitute a violation of defendant's sixth amendment right
to effective representation.
69. See generally notes 100-07 infra and accompanying text.
70. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
71. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
72. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942).
73. See, e.g., Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("An
individual defendant is rarely sophisticated enough to evaluate the potential con.
flicts .... "); United States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620, 623-24 (D.N.J. 1977).
Other courts, however, have found adequate waivers despite only cursory supervision
by trial courts and without regard to the number of defendants represented by one
lawyer. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 969 (1977); United States v. Wisniewski, 478 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1973).
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sufficient to supply this knowledge, nor is the significance of potential
conflicts likely to be understood.7 4 Abstract cautions are unlikely to
be meaningful unless they are related to the specific problems that
may arise in the defendant's particular case. Even if some of these
circumstances are brought home to a defendant, his appreciation of
their potential impact will be minimal unless he understands the
niceties of trial dynamics and the effect that various trial strategies
may have upon the outcome. 5
Moreover, even where the defendant is sophisticated enough to
appreciate the general implications of possible conflicts, the diffi-
culty of an a priori assessment of the likelihood of conflict or the
contexts in which conflicts might arise raises serious questions about
the effectiveness of prospective waivers. Conflicts that were not rea-
sonably foreseeable or that may not even have existed at the start
of trial often develop as trial proceeds. 6 In such a situation, holding
the defendant to his pretrial waiver in effect forces him to waive his
right to object to unknown contingencies." On the other hand, to
allow him to raise the objection seriously undermines the effective-
ness of waiver as a mechanism for preventing significant waste of
judicial resources.
A meaningful pretrial assessment of the possibilities for conflict
is especially difficult for the court. At the start of the trial, the judge
will not know the defenses to be raised on behalf of each defendant,
the potential defenses to be foregone, the weight and sufficiency of
the evidence to be adduced against each defendant, or each defen-
74. Courts in a number of jurisdictions have recognized the inability of many
defendants to appreciate fully the significance of conflicts and have found no waiver,
despite explicit or implicit consent to multiple representation. See, e.g., United States
v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1976) (no waiver despite defendant's consent to
multiple representation), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998 (1977); United States v. Gains.
529 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1976) (defendant was not specifically warned of the risks of
multiple representation).
75. It is worthy of note that in Glasser the Supreme Court found no waiver of
Glasser's sixth amendment rights, despite the fact that Glasser was an experienced
trial lawyer who had served for more than four years as an Assistant United States
Attorney prosecuting criminal cases. See 315 U.S. at 70.72. In view of the conclusion
in Glasser, it is difficult to imagine a case in which a waiver would be invulnerable to
challenge.
76. See text following note 97 infra.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385,406 (2d Cir.), cert. denied.
385 U.S. 957 (1966); People v. George, 259 Cal. App. 2d 424, 66 Cal. Rptr. 442, cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 941 (1968). The serious difficulties involved in attempting to antici-
pate the course that a criminal trial may take have not escaped notice. See Fryar v.
United States, 404 F.2d 1071, 1073 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 964 (1969).
In some cases, courts have refused to find a waiver of conflicts of interest that were
unanticipated and developed during the trial. See, e.g., Larry Buffalo Chief v. South
Dakota, 425 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1970); Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355 (6th Cir.
1954).
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dant's personal history and past criminal record. Without such infor-
mation, the trial judge cannot impress upon a defendant the signifi-
cance of waiver, nor can he evaluate the defendant's appreciation of
it."' These considerations recently prompted one trial judge to char-
acterize the trial court's inquiry as an "ineffective charade"7 and a
"futile exercise.
80
The subtleties involved in conflicts of interest, the inability of
most defendants to grasp the significance of conflicts, the unforeseea-
bility of many conflicts, and the fact that the trial judge is poorly
situated to explain the dangers of the conflicts combine to suggest the
inadequacy of waiver and its vulnerability on appeal. In many cases,
therefore, the insufficiency of waiver of a defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights will loom as a potentially successful ground for reversal.
2. Shifting the Burden of Proof
In the First and Second Circuits, the trial judge in a multiple
representation case is obliged by appellate court rule to "comment
on some of the risks"'" that defendants may confront when jointly
represented and to inquire diligently into whether the defendants
have discussed such risks with their attorney. 2 The trial judge must
point out to the defendants that, by virtue of multiple representation,
each of them foregoes the right to representation by a lawyer whose
exclusive loyalty would be to him alone and that, while particular
defenses and strategies may be in one defendant's best interest, they
may not be in the other's. 3 If the comments and inquiry made to the
78. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals requires, inter alia, that the trial judge
in a multiple representation case elicit a narrative statement from the defendants that
they have been advised of their right to effective assistance of counsel and that they
understand the details and potential perils of their counsel's possible conflict of inter-
est. See United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1975). Although this
narrative enables the trial court to assess a defendant's general understanding of the
problem, the "details" of possible conflicts are unspecified. Moreover, the trial judge
lacks sufficient information concerning any given case to assure that a defendant
actually appreciates the risks that he is running.
Trial judges are not only disadvantaged by ignorance of a variety of significant
facts and circumstances; they also lack the power to obtain that information by inquiry
because of the accused's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the
evidentiary privilege between attorney and client. See United States v. Paz-Sierra, 367
F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 935 (1967); United States v. Gara-
fola, 428 F. Supp. 620, 626 (D.N.J. 1977). See also People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307,
342 N.E.2d 550, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1975).
79. United States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620, 623 (D.N.J. 1977) (Lacey, J.).
80. Id. at 624.
81. United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1972).
82. See United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972).
83. See United States v. Donahue, 560 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (1st Cir. 1977).
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defendants are unsatisfactory to the appellate courts, the burden of
proof shifts to the government to demonstrate that prejudice to any
convicted defendant was improbable.'
Shifting the burden of proof to the government in the absence of
a satisfactory inquiry at the trial level evinces some sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of criminal defendants and the difficulties inher-
ent in proving a conflict of interest." In this respect, the rule is more
solicitous of the interests of the defendant than that employed in
other jurisdictions. However, it also suffers many of the inadequacies
of waiver.8 6 The trial court's comments are necessarily generalized
and are unlikely to satisfactorily apprise a defendant of the real haz-
ards involved in his particular case. Moreover, many conflicts will not
become apparent until trial proceeds. Finally, when trial level inquiry
is adequate, the requirement that the defendant satisfy a "heavy
burden of proof"" to obtain reversal places an additional and sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of successful appeal. Thus, this measure
is inadequate to safeguard fully defendants' rights in a multiple rep-
resentation situation.
3. Severance
Another possible approach to the conflict of interest problem is
to grant the defendants separate trials. A severance may be ordered
by the'trial court in its discretion if, inter alia, a defendant is or may
be prejudiced by a joint trial8 Clearly, some aspects of the conflict
of interest problem may be alleviated by separate trials. For exam-
ple, if severance were granted, counsel could call the defendant with
no prior criminal record to the witness stand without fearing that the
trier of fact would draw a negative inference from the silence of a
codefendant. 8 In other respects, however, severance may not affect a
conflict of interest situation. For example, conflicts stemming from
division of loyalty at the plea bargaining stage and at sentencing
remain unaltered by severance. Indeed, a number of sixth amend-
84. Although no particular form of inquiry is prescribed, the First Circuit in
Donahue found the trial court's inquiry insufficient and concluded that the govern-
ment had failed to sustain its burden of proof. From the trial record, the court of
appeals could not conclude with certainty that the potential conflict had not influ-
enced counsel's choice of strategies. See id. at 1044.
85. Compare id., with United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977).
86. See notes 70-80 supra and accompanying text.
87. See United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1972). Although the precise
nature of this burden has not yet been adjudicated, presumably a defendant will be
required to prove, from the record, that an actual conflict existed.
88. See, e.g., Fm. R. CirM. P. 14.
89. See generally notes 35-40 supra and accompanying text.
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ment cases involve situations in which severance was in fact granted,
but a conflict of interest nevertheless required reversal."
4. Initial Appointment of Separate Counsel
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
devised a rule, apparently as a matter of statutory construction, re-
quiring that separate counsel for indigent codefendants be appointed
initially in every case." If, after fully investigating the case, counsel
concludes that both the interests of justice and the interests of the
client will best be served by joint representation, the trial court may
allow it.2
Certainly the interests of neither justice" nor the defendants are
well served if there remains a substantial possibility that a conflict
will develop during the course of trial. Consequently, in order to
satisfy the District of Columbia standard, counsel must presumably
convince the court that a conflict of interest does not exist and is
unlikely to arise during the trial. In view of the numerous ways in
which such conflicts may arise94 and the inability of even experienced
counsel to predict the course that a trial will take, 5 it would appear
to be unlikely that a conscientious attorney will be able to provide
the court with an assurance of unimpaired advocacy. Nevertheless,
multiple representation has not been eliminated from the District of
Columbia. Thus, despite its obvious merits, the rule is inadequate.
Although it discourages multiple representation, it does not proscribe
it, and problems with conflicts of interest will, therefore, inevitably
remain."'
90. See, e.g., Austin v. Erickson, 477 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Pinc, 452 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1971). Even assuming, arguendo, that severance may in
some cases alleviate a defense lawyer's conflict of interest, the solution may be costly.
Severance is particularly burdensome to an already over-taxed criminal trial system.
Thus there may be a strong public interest favoring joint trial in order to conserve the
time of the courts, prosecutors, witnesses, and jurors. See, e.g., United States v.
Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Hines, 455 F.2d 1317,
1334 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 975 (1972).
91. See Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The court's
rule is fashioned to achieve compliance with the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. §
3006A(b) (1964) ("[Tjhe court shall appoint separate counsel for defendants who have
such conflicting interests that they cannot properly be represented by the same coun-
sel. ... ), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1970).
92. See 379 F.2d at 126.
93. See note 122 infra; notes 141-50 infra and accompanying text.
94. See notes 24-54 supra and accompanying text.
95. See text following note 97 infra.
96. Some courts outside the District of Columbia Circuit have suggested that
separate counsel should be used in multiple defendant cases, but none has required
separate counsel. See State v. Robinson, 271 Minn. 477, 481,136 N.W.2d 401, 405, cert.
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5. Responsibility of the Defense Attorney
In a number of jurisdictions, courts have placed significant re-
sponsibility for safeguarding the sixth amendment rights of multiple
defendants upon the defense attorney. 7 The allocation of responsibil-
ity to trial advocates is premised on a judicial recognition of the
inadequacy of appellate review with respect to conflicts problems and
the inability of trial courts to conduct meaningful inquiries into the
existence of facts and circumstances that may produce conflicts. It
presupposes, however, that defense counsel is able to determine
whether a conflict exists or is likely to arise during trial.
Even the most experienced and diligent advocates may not be
able to anticipate conflicts before they develop. By its nature, the
criminal trial is a dynamic process, laden with variables and unfore-
seeable contingencies. Extensive trial experience and preparation
provide only limited vision; an advocate can guarantee neither the
course of trial nor its outcome. Three examples are illustrative. First,
unexpected testimony and other evidence introduced by the prosecu-
tor may require a shift in defense strategies that creates inconsisten-
cies among defenses available to each accused. Second, defendants
are usually ill-equipped to assesswhich facts are relevant to their case
and may fail to disclose vital information to their attorney. Unless the
lawyer asks the right question initially, he may not discover material
facts creating a conflict among his clients until mid-trial. Third, it
is hardly uncommon for a defendant to attempt, at least initially, to
protect a codefendant. After extensive trial preparation, however, a
defendant may perceive that his initial version of the facts, protective
of the interests of others, is injurious to his own cause. At that point,
his instinct for self-preservation may exceed his loyalty, and he may
change his story, producing a conflict of interest not previously per-
ceived or anticipated.
Despite these difficulties, however, reliance upon the attorneys
themselves is clearly a step in the right direction. Many conflicts that
undermine a defendant's sixth amendment rights may escape detec-
tion on review. Moreover, the appellate court's only remedy-to re-
mand for a new trial-is extremely costly in terms of the public's
interest in a just, expeditious, and inexpensive disposition. Although
denied, 382 U.S. 948 (1965); May v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Ky. 1965).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1049 (1976); Holland v. Henderson, 460 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Paz-Sierra, 367 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 395 (1967);
Lugo v. United States, 350 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Garafola, 428 F.
Supp. 620 (D.N.J. 1977); People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 342 N.E.2d 550, 379
N.Y.S.2d 769 (1975).
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the remedy for these problems must come at the trial level, it is not
possible for the trial courts adequately to distinguish those few cases
in which conflicts will not arise from the great mass of those in which
they may. The legal system must rely, therefore, upon the defense
attorney to prevent the problems of conflict.
Few courts that have placed reliance upon the bar to avoid con-
flicts of interest have delineated the defense advocate's particular
responsibilities in a multiple representation situation." Some, how-
ever, have relied upon the ethical responsibilities contained in the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility and the ABA Defense
Standards." The following sections will explore the dictates of these
standards in a multiple representation context.
II. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A. ETHICAL AND SixTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS COMPARED
The allegation of a conflict of interest in the concurrent represen-
tation of two or more criminal defendants presents a problem that
impinges not only upon the defendants' constitutional rights but
98. In United States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620 (D.N.J. 1977), however, a
federal district court advanced a supervisory rule disallowing multiple representation
of criminal defendants unless the attorney affirmatively states that he knows all of the
facts of the defense, is totally aware of the government's case, and "there is absolutely
no possibility, however remote, of a conflict arising in his joint representation of the
defendants." Id. at 626. In cases when counsel misstates the situation, the court noted
that "disciplinary measures should be pursued by the offended trial judge." Id.
The probable effect of the Garafola decision is obvious. Few trial lawyers will risk
disciplinary sanctions in order to represent multiple defendants, and it is difficult to
imagine a situation in which the required affirmation could be made. Multiple repre-
sentation, therefore, is likely to be eliminated by the court's requirements.
99. See, e.g., People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 314, 342 N.E.2d 550, 554, 379
N.Y.S.2d 769, 775 (1975):
[Tihe court places reliance upon the willingness and ability of defense
counsel to perform their duties in a forthright and professional manner.
Attorneys are under an ethical obligation to disclose to their clients, at the
earliest possible time, any conflicting interests that might cloud their repre-
sentation. Disclosure alone is not enough. The lawyer may not act for the
client unless the client has given his informed consent to further representa-
tion. (Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 5-16, DR 5-101[A], DR 5-105
[B], [C]; ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function, §3.5[a],
[b].)
Accord, United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1049 (1976).
The ABA Defense Standards are intended as guides to the practicing bar in the
performance of criminal defense functions. See ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note
55, Defense Function §1.1(e). Although the standards are not obligatory upon the bar,
various states have created committees to consider adoption of the ABA Standards as
part of their disciplinary rules.
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upon the attorney's ethical responsibilities."' Beyond the general ob-
ligation of an attorney to assure that his performance is not so inade-
quate as to violate his client's sixth amendment rights,'0 ' the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly requires the attorney to
avoid accepting or continuing multiple employment "if the exercise
of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be
or is likely to be adversely affected" by the employment.' " These
two dimensions of the problem are not coextensive in either theory
or practice.10 Sixth amendment analysis focuses upon the perform-
ance of counsel after multiple representation commences to deter-
mine the constitutional sufficiency of that representation. The ethi-
cal obligations of the defense lawyer, on the other hand, address the
propriety of undertaking multiple representation in the first place.
Thus, while the constitutional analysis is result oriented, concentrat-
ing upon the discernible effects of multiple representation,'0 ' the ethi-
100. See generally notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
101. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility does not explicitly require an
attorney to safeguard the constitutional rights of his client, but a lawyer is precluded
from handling a legal matter that he knows or should know is beyond his competence.
See ABA CODE OF PRoFESSIoNAL REsPONsIBuILT DR 6-101(A)(1). Similarly, an attorney
may be disciplined for handling a legal matter without adequate preparation, see id.
DR 6-101(A)(2), or for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him, see id. DR 6-
101(A)(3).
102. Id. DR 5-105(A), (B) (emphasis added). DR 5-105(C) provides what pur-
ports to be an exception to this rule:
In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent
multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest
of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the
possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent
professional judgment on behalf of each.
It is unclear how section (C) constitutes anything more than an affirmative paraphrase
of the prohibitions in sections (A) and (B). It is difficult to conceive of a situation where
a lawyer's "independent professional judgment. . . is likely to be adversely affected"
by multiple employment but where it is nevertheless "obvious that he can adequately
represent the interest" of each client. Despite the apparent redundancy, the
"exception" does serve a significant function. It provides explicit assurance that multi-
ple representation is not prohibited and deprives sections (A) and (B) of all objec-
tivity, allowing the attorney himself to be the judge of the "obvious."
Insofar as DR 5-105 addresses potential as well as actual conflicts, it appears to
be more stringent than prevailing interpretations of the sixth amendment. See notes
104-06 infra and accompanying text.
103. The practical difference is well illustrated by jurisdictions that require a
showing of prejudice to justify reversal of a conviction for a conflict of interest. See
note 16 supra. In such jurisdictions, a lawyer may violate his professional duties to a
client, yet if his impairment of loyalty is not sufficiently egregious to create demonstra-
ble prejudice, the conviction will stand.
104. Some courts have exercised their supervisory responsibilities to prevent
conflicts before they develop. See Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(providing for initial appointment of separate counsel in all indigent cases); United
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cal rules specifically confront the conflict of interest issue at the time
the lawyer accepts employment."' Because the ethical standard em-
braces conflict avoidance, it is more protective of both the clients'
and society's interests than is the remedial standard of the sixth
amendment.' Although the importance of sixth amendment appel-
late scrutiny should not be disparaged, it is appropriate to look to the
professional responsibility of lawyers themselves for a solution to
multiple representation problems.'
B. THE ETHICAL STANDARD: PROSPECTIVE AVOIDANCE OF CONFLICTS
Largely because of the fiduciary character of the relationship
between attorney and client,' an attorney is precluded from repre-
senting clients whose interests are likely to conflict as well as those
whose positi6ns are actually antagonistic.'2 Under the ABA Canons
of Professional Ethics, the predecessor of the current ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility, the prohibition on representation of
conflicting interests was literally limited to situations where the
interests were actually antithetical.10 Nevertheless, the provision
States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620 (D.N.J. 1977) (requiring defense counsel to affirm
that no conflict will arise before allowing multiple representation).
105. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RZsPONSIaILrry DR 5-101(A), (B), DR 5-
105(A).
106. The obligation of counsel to safeguard the rights of a client is, at least in
part, subsumed under the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. See note 101
supra.
107. In one recent case, a court "constitutionalized" the ethical responsibilities
of attorneys by defining effective assistance of counsel to include "such adherence to
ethical standards with respect to avoidance of conflicting interests as is generally
expected from the bar." United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 1973). Other courts have expressly avoided this approach. See, e.g.. United
States ex rel. Robinson v. Housewright, 525 F.2d 988, 994 (7th Cir. 1975).
108. The granting of a license to practice law accords to the recipient a right to
represent others. Because he possesses this right, a lawyer is held to strict ethical
standards that are fiduciary in nature. See Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1964);
Kelly v. Greason, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 244 N.E.2d 456, 296 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1968); ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RzsPoNsianmrrY EC 4-1; H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHics 89-96 (1953); R.
WISE, LEGAL ETHics 276 (2d ed. 1970). The fiduciary character of the relationship
requires a scrupulous adherence to the duty of undivided loyalty that will be care-
fully scrutinized and strictly enforced by the courts. See Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d
168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNSIimrrY EC 5-1; cf. Moin-
hard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) (defining the fiduciary duties of
business partners).
109. See R. WIsE, supra note 108, at 257.
110. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHmics No. 6 provided in part, "It is unprofes-
sional to represent conflicting interests, except after full disclosure of the facts. Within
the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of
one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him
to oppose."
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was consistently interpreted to require lawyers to avoid not only the
representation of obviously incompatible interests but also the "prob-
ability or possibility that such a situation may develop."",
The present ABA Code of Professional Responsibility signifi-
cantly amplifies the conflicts rule of the Canons, addressing various
specific situations in which a lawyer's duty to "exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of a client""2 may be compro-
mised.13 In each instance, the Code explicitly precludes representa-
tion of a client whenever a lawyer's professional judgment is likely to
be adversely affected."'
A lawyer's professional obligation, therefore, is not limited to
withdrawal from representation once a conflict of interest develops.
An attorney must anticipate potential conflicts and decline employ-
ment in situations likely to impede the exercise of disinterested judg-
ment on behalf of his client. Of course, a lawyer need not decline
employment in every situation where a conflict might conceivably
arise," 5 but he may not await the development of an actual conflict
111. Ii. DRINKER, supra note 108, at 104; accord, R. Wis., supra note 108, at
256-57.
112. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmLrY, CANON 5.
113. The Code addresses conflicts between a client and his attorney, see id. DR
5-101(A); conflicts between the attorney's litigative role as advocate and as trial wit-
ness, see id. DR 5-101(B), DR 5-102; and conflicts between the client's interests and
those of counsel in litigation, see id. DR 5-103, or in business transactions, see id. DR
5-104. The Code also sets forth rules governing conflicts between or among clients,
see id. DR 5-105(A)-(D), and conflicts between a client and third parties, see id. DR
5-107.
114. A lawyer is prohibited from accepting employment where his professional
judgment reasonably may be affected by his own interests: "Except with the consent
of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise
of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be af-
fected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests." Id. DR 5.101
(A). The ethical considerations corroborate the requirement that a lawyer shall de-
cline employment if there exists a reasonble likelihood or probability that a conflict
will arise. See, e.g., id. EC 5-2, EC 5-3.
Similarly, a lawyer is obliged to refuse employment if his independent professional
judgment on behalf of a client is likely to be adversely affected by the interests of the
new client. "A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his inde-
pendent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment . . . except to the extent
permitted under DR 5-105(C)." Id. DR 5-105(A).
Once iiultiple employment is undertaken, an attorney must disengage if his judg-
ment is likely to be adversely affected. "A lawyer shall not continue multiple employ-
ment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will
be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client ...
except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C)." Id. DR 5.105(B).
115. It has been suggested that the mere possibility of a conflict developing at
some future point does not prevent a lawyer from representing a client. See State v.
Garaygordobil, 89 Ariz. 161, 359 P.2d 753 (1961).
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of interest before declining, or withdrawing from, employment. The
test for determining whether an alleged conflict impedes the perform-
ance of a lawyer's duties is probability, not certainty."' A trial court
is not, therefore, obliged to wait until conflict is certain before it may
disqualify a lawyer from a representation." 7
The duty to avoid representing conflicting interests is intimately
related to the lawyer's obligation to preserve and protect the confid-
ences and secrets of a client'" "without regard to the nature or source
of information or the fact that others share the knowledge." ' 9 An
attorney, therefore, may not represent adversaries in litigation, 2 ' not
only because their interests are directly combative, but also because
he is privy to their confidences and could use them to their detriment
during the course of litigation. Moreover, the very nature of an adver-
sary proceeding suggests the inability of a lawyer to function ade-
quately as the advocate of each.
Thus, a likelihood of conflict is inherent in certain kinds of situa-
tions, and the lawyer is ethically obligated to avoid them. 2 ' He may
116. See Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975), aff'd per curiam on
rehearing, 466 Pa. 172, 352 A.2d 11, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976); Commonwealth
ex rel. Whitling v. Russell, 406 Pa. 45, 176 A.2d 641 (1962).
117. See Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 529, 341 A.2d 896, 905 (1975). af'd per
curiam on rehearing, 466 Pa. 172, 352 A.2d 11, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
118. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101.
119. Id. EC 4-4. See Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), appeal dismissed sub nom. Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959). The lawyer's obligation survives the termination of his
employment. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 4-6.
120. See, e.g., Hall v. Shippers Express, Inc., 234 N.C. 38, 65 S.E.2d 333 (1951);
Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 390 Pa. 231, 135 A.2d 252 (1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 966 (1958). A distinction has been drawn, however, between litigative and
nonlitigative matters. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILrry EC 5-15. The
distinction is presumably based upon the notion that the parties are not necessarily
adversaries in matters not involving litigation. Although a number of jurisdictions
allow a lawyer to represent both parties to a contract, for example, the practice must
be cautiously undertaken. See, e.g., Stump v. Flint, 195 Kan. 2, 402 P.2d 794 (1965).
Moreover, the attorney should withdraw completely once a dispute arises. See, e.g..
Craft Builders, Inc. v. Ellis D. Taylor, Inc., 254 A.2d 233 (Del. 1969).
121. The lawyer is ethically obliged to decline employment in a number of situa-
tions where conflicts and abuses of confidence are likely to occur. For example, counsel
may not successively represent one party in an adversary proceeding and the opposing
party in a subsequent proceeding concerning the same subject matter. See, e.g., In re
Maltby, 68 Ariz. 153, 202 P.2d 902 (1949); In re Blatt, 42 N.J. 522, 201 A.2d 715 (1964);
Northeastern Okla. Community Dev. Corp. v. Adams, 510 P.2d 939 (Okla. 1973); cf.
In re Braun, 49 N.J. 16, 227 A.2d 506 (1967) (counsel had previously advised opposing
party). Nor may he oppose a former client on a matter substantially related to the
subject matter of a prior representation. See, e.g., Kreda v. Rush, 550 F.2d 888 (3d
Cir. 1977); Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976); In re Yarn
Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1976); Redd v. Shell Oil
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properly be disqualified before a potential, but reasonably foreseea-
ble, conflict culminates in a clear impairment of his independent
professional judgment. The requirements that a lawyer avoid con-
flicts and preserve confidences are attempts to protect and advance
the interests of the client and the public in the fair and expeditious
administration of justice.' A defense counsel's ethical duties in the
course of representing criminal codefendants should be reviewed with
no less concern for the interests of clients and of justice and should
reflect the legitimate interests served by the ethical rules.
Co., 518 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1975); American Roller Co. v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982 (3d
Cir. 1975); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973); Cord v.
Smith, 338 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1964). See generally Note, Attorney's Conflict of Inter-
ests: Representation of Interest Adverse to That of Former Client, 55 B.U.L. Rxv. 61
(1975). In both situations, it is likely that counsel would possess confidential informa-
tion that could be employed to advance the cause of the other client. Counsel is subject
to judicial disqualification in such instances without proof of an actual conflict or a
demonstration that he has access to client confidences that may be relevant to the
current matter. See, e.g., Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir.
1976); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973); T.C. Theatre
Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); ABA Coat.
ON PROFESSIONAL EMiCS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 885 (1965). See also Cord v. Smith,
338 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1964).
In several jurisdictions, courts have also held that an attorney who represents a
client in one matter may not concurrently oppose that client in another matter, even
in the absence of any relationship between the two cases. See, e.g., Cinema 5. Ltd. v.
Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Evans, 113 Ariz. 458, 556 P.2d 792
(1976); Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 203 A.2d 82 (1964); In re Kushin-
sky, 53 N.J. 1, 247 A.2d 665 (1968).
In no case will a conflict of interest for one lawyer be removed when the case is
transferred to another lawyer in his firm. The ethical obligations of the lawyer preclude
substituting any member of his firm as counsel. See Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); Commonwealth
v. Geraway, 364 Mass. 168, 301 N.E.2d 814 (1973); Kurbitz v. Kurbitz, 77 Wash. 2d
943, 468 P.2d 673 (1970); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmmrr DR 5-105(D). The
vicarious disqualification of an entire firm is predicated in part upon a client's reasona-
ble expectations that he has effectively retained the entire firm, and it is further
justified by the reasonable possibility or inference that members of the same firm will
exchange confidences and have access to information contained in firm files. This
inference may, however, be rebutted. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
122.' Judicial efforts to avoid actual and potential conflicts of interest are moti-
vated, at least in part, by the belief that the public interest in the proper administra-
tion of justice requires vigilance. See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562,
571 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally Morgan, supra note 2. In certain cases concern for
the maintenance of public confidence in the bar has also played a significant role in
judicial assessments of the propriety of representation. See, e.g., Grievance Comm. v.
Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 65, 203 A.2d 82, 84 (1964).
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C. CONFLICTS AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
It has been demonstrated that multiple representation presents
a situation in which the lawyer's independent professional judgment
is likely to be adversely affected.' 3 In such circumstances, the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility purports to compel the lawyer to
decline employment.12 1 Given the plethora of appellate decisions sus-
taining challenges to the adequacy of representation,'25 however, it
appears that Judge Judd's observation that lawyers have often failed
to fulfill their responsibility to avoid real and apparent conflict'" is,
if anything, an understatement.
The specific causes of this failure are several, but they are all
generally rooted in the significant qualification that the ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility puts on the duty to avoid situations
that are likely to produce conflicts.'2 Disciplinary Rule 5-105 of the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer may
represent multiple clients only "if it is obvious that he can adequately
represent the interest of each and if each consents to the representa-
tion after a full disclosure of the possible effect of [multiple] repre-
sentation."''2 Although the dimensions of the required disclosure are
not enumerated in the Disciplinary Rule, 2 a generalized explanation
that an attorney's obligation to other clients may impair his represen-
123. See notes 25-54 supra and accompanying text.
124. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A). In addition,
the ABA Defense Standards, designed to provide guidance to the criminal trial bar,
explicitly note that the "potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple
defendants is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to act for more than one
of several co-defendants ...... ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 55, Defense
Function § 3.5(b).
125. See generally notes 25-54 supra and accompanying text.
126. See Judd, Conflicts of Interest-A Trial Judge's Notes, 44 FoRDtAbi L. REv.
1097 (1976).
127. In this context it is, or should be, surprising that, despite the apparent
frequency of conflicts in multiple representation situations, remarkably few discipli-
nary actions have ever been brought against attorneys for representing conflicting
interests. It is simply inconceivable that none of these cases involved situations where
the lawyer did not at some point realize that his independent professional judgment
was likely to be adversely affected by accepting or continuing multiple representation.
In one of the few reported cases of such disciplinary action, an attorney was
censured for continuing to represent one defendant after withdrawing as counsel for a
codefendant who testified for the state. See State v. Hilton, 217 Kan. 694, 538 P.2d
977 (1975). See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 835 (1968); see also State v. Sullivan,
20 Kan. 842, 504 P.2d 190 (1972).
128. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5.105(C). See also ABA
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 6 (The Canons were the predecessor of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.).
129. But see ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16 (the lawyer
should fully explain to each client the implications of common representation).
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tation of a particular client is hardly sufficient to fully acquaint a lay-
person with the potential implications of multiple representation.
Judicial interpretations of the disclosure requirement oblige the law-
yer to explain potential impairments of professional judgment with
specific reference to conflicts that may foreseeably arise in the con-
text of the particular case.' From plea bargaining to sentencing, the
defense lawyer must detail the significance of potential conflicts and
bring home to the clients why it may be desirable for them to be
independently represented."'
In practice, the probable sufficiency of disclosure and consent is
open to serious question. It is ironic that the attorney, whose in-
dependent professional judgment is or may be impaired, is charged
with the responsibility of obtaining the informed consent of his
clients to continued representation.'32 Insofar as an attorney's fees
increase with the number of defendants simultaneously repre-
sented,'1 the irony is compounded by the obvious economic interest
the attorney has in obtaining and retaining multiple defendants. The
lawyer's pecuniary interest, therefore, may influence his estimation
of the significance of the conflict situation and the content of his dis-
closure.
The sufficiency of disclosure may be questioned for other rea-
sons. At least one empirical study of lawyers' ethics suggests that
avoiding conflicts of interest is not a high priority among practicing
attorneys.' Another study indicates that lawyers are ignorant of all
but the most basic rules encompassed by the Code of Professional
Responsibility and apply their personal standards rather than those
required by the Code in making ethical decisions.', It is doubtful
130. See, e.g., In re Lanza, 65 N.J. 347, 352-53, 322 A.2d 445, 448 (1974); In re
Kamp, 40 N.J. 588, 595-96, 194 A.2d 236, 240 (1963); In re Sedor, 73 Wis. 2d 629, 639,
245 N.W.2d 895, 900 (1976).
131. See, e.g., In re Kamp, 40 N.J. 588, 595-96, 194 A.2d 236, 240 (1963); In re
Boivin, 271 Or. 419, 424, 533 P.2d 171, 174 (1975).
132. See Gibson, ABA Code Canon 5-Professional Judgment, 48 Tax. L. REv.
351, 364 (1970) (commenting on the deficiencies of the Code's consent provision: "If
the lawyer has proceeded to the stage of full disclosure, it would seem that he has
already determined that he desires to represent the client and, therefore, desires the
client's consent.").
133. One eminent criminal attorney has observed that multiple representation
of criminal defendants is a defense counsel's dream, in part owing to the larger fee that
such representation will justify. See Cole, Time for a Change: Multiple Representation
Should Be Stopped, 2 NAT'L J. Cans. DEF. 149, 149 (1976). See also note 165 infra and
accompanying text.
134. See J. CANw, LAwYERS' ETIcs: A SuavEs oF THE New YoRK Crry BAR 48,
50, 53, 144 (1966).
135. See Burbank & Duboff, Ethics and the Legal Profession: A Survey of
Boston Lawyers, 9 SuFFoLK L. REv. 66, 92-93 (1974) (only sixteen percent of the Boston
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that a criminal defense attorney who has neither a sophisticated
knowledge of conflicts of interest nor a particularly strong concern for
them can adequately apprise defendants of the potential risks in-
volved in multiple representation.
Even assuming adequate disclosure by counsel, one must seri-
ously question the ability of most criminal defendants to appreciate
fully the significance of conflicts of interest.' Because of the relation-
ship of trust between attorney and client and the defendant's relative
ignorance of criminal trial dynamics, a defendant is likely to defer to
the judgment of his counsel'37 and rely upon counsel's representation
that he can adequately serve the interests of all defendants.
The consent of criminal defendants, even if properly obtained,
is not sufficient to justify multiple representation under Disciplinary
Rule 5-105; counsel must also satisfy a second criterion.'38 Employ-
ment by multiple clients may not be accepted unless it is "obvious
that [the lawyer] can adequately represent the interests of each
[client]."'39 Given the manifold circumstances under which a de-
lawyers surveyed normally relied upon the Massachusetts version of Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility in resolving actual problems).
136. Courts in a number of jurisdictions have questioned the reliability of con-
sent given by a client who is likely to be lacking the sophistication necessary to under-
stand fully the ramifications of conflicts. See, e.g., In re Westmoreland, 270 F. Supp.
408 (M.D. Ga. 1967); In re Lanza, 65 N.J. 347, 353, 322 A.2d 445, 449 (1974) (Pashman,
J., concurring); Kelly v. Greason, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 244 N.E.2d 456, 296 N.Y.S.2d 937
(1968). See generally Los ANGELES CouNTY BAR Ass'N COMM. ON LEGAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 207 (1953). The obstacles to obtaining informed consent to multiple
representation present the same kinds of difficulties that courts have encountered in
the context of intelligent waivers of sixth amendment rights. See notes 73-80 supra and
accompanying text.
137. See United States v. Donahue, 560 F.2d 1039, 1044 (1st Cir. 1977); Gibson,
supra note 132, at 363-64.
138. Under the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, it was recognized that, in
certain cases, representation was unwise or improper even with the consent of affected
clients. See H. DaNKER, supra note 108, at 120; R. WISE, supra note 108, at 258. As
Drinker observed,
Canon [6] does not sanction representation of conflicting interests in every
case where such consent is given, but merely forbids it except in such cases.
The American Bar Association has acquiesced in the numerous decisions of
its Ethics Committee construing the exception as not exclusive, and consent
as unavailable where the public interest is involved.
H. DINKER, supra note 108, at 120. Indeed, in construing Canon 6, the ABA Ethics
Committee found consent insufficient in the circumstances involved. See ABA COMM.
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 112 (1934); accord, NEw YoRK CrrY BAR ASS'N
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 71 (1926-1927), No. 223 (1932), No. 235
(1932), reprinted in 0. MAu, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS (1970).
139. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C). New Jersey has
modified the ABA Code to allow an attorney to represent consenting clients "if he
believes that he can adequately represent the interests of each." RULES GOVERNING TIlE
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fense lawyer's professional trial judgment may be impaired,"' how-
ever, it would seem that it could never be obvious that a defense
attorney can adequately represent the interests of codefendants in a
criminal case. It is submitted, therefore, that multiple representation
in a criminal matter presents a situation that this aspect of the Code
rule is designed to prevent and that the professional responsibilities
of the attorney are unfulfilled regardless of consent.
Ultimately, however, a focus solely upon the interests of the
client is entirely too narrow and reflects the misordering of priorities
that Professor Morgan suggests is characteristic of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility generally."' Treating multiple representation
problems with reference only to the interests of the client ignores
totally the substantial public interests that are at stake."' The prob-
lems that arise in the context of multiple representation impinge so
substantially upon these public interests that the consent of the
client should often, if not always, be insufficient to justify multiple
representation.
It is well established that a lawyer may not represent conflicting
or potentially conflicting interests, even with the clients' consent,
where the public interest is involved."0 In criminal cases, the public
interest in the fairness of the criminal process and its expeditious
administration are substantial. Clearly, the administration of justice
may be adversely affected by multiple representation."' Considering
COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEw JER Ey, CODE OF PRoFESSioNAL REsPoNsmIIrY DR 5.
105(C) (West 1977).
140. See notes 25-54 supra and accompanying text.
141. See note 2 supra.
142. See note 2 supra; note 122 supra and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., In re Abrams, 56 N.J. 271, 266 A.2d 275 (1970); In re A & B, 44
N.J. 331, 209 A.2d 101 (1965) (municipal attorney may not represent land and building
developers even though no actual conflict shown and consent of clients obtained); Ahto
v. Weaver, 39 N.J. 418, 189 A.2d 27 (1963) (dicta); Kelly v. Greason, 23 N.Y.2d 368,
244 N.E.2d 456, 296 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1968) (dicta); In re Themelis, 117 Vt. 19, 83 A.2d
507 (1951) (prohibiting successive representation of consenting husband and wife in
divorce proceedings); State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968) (attor-
ney should not undermine public confidence in the legal profession through conduct
appearing to exert undue influence).
144. Potential detriment to the public interest in the administration of justice
is perhaps best illustrated in the context of conflicts of interest that develop either after
or shortly before trial has begun. Assume that defendant A and defendant B are
charged with first degree murder and are represented by a single defense counsel. After
extensive trial preparation, and immediately prior to trial, the defense attorney learns
certain facts that create serious inconsistencies between the defenses available to each
of the codefendants. At this juncture, counsel has undoubtedly interviewed, and ac-
quired substantial confidential information from, each defendant as part of his trial
preparation. Consistent with his ethical obligations, the defense attorney is obliged to
withdraw from the representation of both defendants. See State v. Hilton, 217 Kan.
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the notoriously overcrowded condition of criminal trial dockets
throughout the country and the frequency with which multiple repre-
sentation cases form the basis of appeals and habeas corpus petitions,
the administration of criminal justice is largely disserved when an
attorney represents multiple defendants regardless of whether actual
conflict or prejudice exists. "5
It may also be argued that a discernible public interest exists in
assuring that the prosecutorial function is not frustrated. For exam-
ple, the interests of a defendant who is either innocent or less culpa-
ble than another may lie in cooperation with governmental authori-
ties. If, however, one attorney represents all defendants accused of a
criminal offense, this cooperation will be made much more difficult
to obtain since it is likely to involve testimony against other defen-
dants. Thus collective advocacy may frustrate the interests of both
the individual defendant and the public by allowing the defendants
collectively to construct a stone wall to obstruct governmental at-
tempts at achieving cooperation."' The hazards of this phenomenon
have been held sufficient to justify disqualification of counsel. " ,
694, 538 P.2d 977 (1975); cf. In re Lanza, 65 N.J. 347, 322 A.2d 445 (1974) (representa-
tion of buyer and seller in real estate transaction); In re Braun, 49 N.J. 16, 227 A.2d
506 (1967) (counseling husband on marital matters subsequent to representation of
wife in divorce). If the lawyer attempts to withdraw from representation of defendant
A, while continuing to represent defendant B, confidences and secrets obtained from
defendant A may consciously or unconsciously be employed to A's detriment. Although
this situation has rarely been confronted in the context of criminal litigation, contin-
ued representation of either client seems clearly precluded, at least absent full disclo-
sure and consent. See State v. Hilton, 217 Kan. 694, 538 P.2d 977 (1975). See generally
notes 108-22 supra and accompanying text. In short, a serious risk is run in every such
trial that each jointly represented defendant will be compelled to retain new counsel
once a serious conflict of interest surfaces. The impact upon the efficiency of criminal
justice is obvious: trials of the affected defendants, and perhaps those of other defen-
dants awaiting trial, will be postponed.
145. The costs of multiple representation can be substantial, even where the
sixth amendment challenge is unsuccessful. First, even a futile appeal imposes sub-
stantial burdens on both the defendant and the efficient administration of justice.
Second, and perhaps more significant, the fact that an appeal is unsuccessful is in no
way a guarantee that actual prejudice did not, in fact, exist. As noted earlier, the
adequacy of the trial record as a basis for determining the existence of a conflict is
dubious at best, and many conflicts may not be apparent on appellate review. See
notes 57-69 supra and accompanying text. Consequently, multiple representation im-
poses upon the judicial system the not inconsiderable prospect of imposing punishment
upon a person who has, in fact, not been adequately represented by counsel.
146. See generally Cole, supra note 133.
147. See In re Abrams, 56 N.J. 271, 266 A.2d 275 (1970) (impermissible conflict
of interest where attorney was paid by defendant's employer, who allegedly partici-
pated in illegality, because public interest in disclosure of employer's criminal enter-
prise was frustrated); Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975) (multiple
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The public interest is perhaps most significantly offended when
multiple representation prevents the defense attorney from fulfilling
his vital role in assuring the fairness of the criminal process.' 5 The
adversarial system of criminal justice is predicated upon the unbri-
dled combative zeal of the advocates."' But a criminal defense attor-
ney whose trial conduct is affected by conflicts among his clients
ceases to be a true advocate for any of them. Since multiple represen-
tation makes loyalty to the best interests of each client difficult, if
not impossible,'50 it must inevitably compromise the integrity of the
adversarial system of criminal justice. Thus, the lawyer's professional
duty to the courts and the administration of justice remains unful-
filled whether or not he obtains the consent of his clients.
II. A PROPOSAL
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, as written, should
be interpreted to prohibit an attorney from representing multiple
defendatits in a criminal matter. The Code does not explicitly pro-
scribe the practice, but it does strongly admonish against multiple
representation, urging lawyers to resolve all doubts against the pro-
priety of representation and suggesting that "there are few situations
in which [an attorney] would be justified in representing in litiga-
tion multiple clients with potentially differing interests."' 5 ' Despite
representation of witnesses before grand jury disallowed on grounds of public interest
in secrecy of grand jury proceedings), afl'd per curiam on rehearing, 466 Pa. 172, 352
A.2d 11, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
In other recent opinions, however, courts have not been persuaded by the argu.
ment that grand jury functions are necessarily frustrated by multiple representation
of witnesses. See In re Grand Jury Empaneled January 21, 1975, 536 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir.
1976) (dicta); In re Investigation Before the April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (dicta).
148. The public interest in criminal justice is particularly substantial since the
criminal law by its nature addresses wrongs against society as a whole. See ABA CoDe
OF PROFEsSIONAL RssPoNsInIr EC 7-21. As Professor Wechsler has eloquently put it,
[W]hatever view one holds about the penal law, no one will question its
importance in society. This is the law on which men place their ultimate
reliance for protection against all the deepest injuries that human conduct
can inflict on individuals and institutions .... If penal law is weak or inef-
fective, basic human interests are in jeopardy. If it is harsh or arbitrary in
its impact, it works a gross injustice on those caught within its toils. The law
that carries such responsibilities should surely be as rational and just as law
can be. Nowhere in the entire legal field is more at stake for the community
or for the individual.
Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARv. L. Rav. 1097, 1098 (1952).
149. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RasPoNsummrn EC 7-19.
150. See notes 25-54 supra and accompanying text.
151. ABA ConE OF PROFESSioNAL RasPoNsmrrY EC 5-15. The ABA Standards
Relating to the Defense Function advise the criminal defense attorney to decline to act
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these admonitions, however, the ultimate determinations of the exist-
ence of conflicts, the adequacy of disclosure, and the sufficiency of
consent are left to the attorney involved. Furthermore, it does not
appear that the Code's ethical cautions have been heeded since the
representation of codefendants by a single lawyer remains a wide-
spread and lucrative practice. These factors suggest the need for an
explicit disciplinary prohibition against multiple representation.
Arguments may, of course, be advanced against such a prohibi-
tion,'52 but they are either inaccurate or insufficient to overcome the
individual and public interests served by the proposal. For example,
it might be argued that the proposal would be an unconstitutional
deprivation of the defendant's constitutional right to representation
by the attorney of his choice. In Faretta v. California,' the United
States Supreme Court held that a defendant has a sixth amendment
right to waive counsel altogether.5 ' At least one court has suggested
that a defendant therefore has a constitutional right to waive the
effective assistance of counsel and choose a lawyer who serves con-
flicting interests.'55 The latter, however, does not follow ineluctably
from the former. An accused does not have an automatic constitu-
tional right to the antithesis of a constitutional right.", In Faretta the
Court found an independent right of self-representation and stated
that it did not arise mechanically from a defendant's power to waive
the right to assistance of counsel. 57 Thus, if an accused has a sixth
for more than one of several codefendants "except in unusual situations." ABA
DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 55, Defense Function § 3.5(b). The ABA Standards
enumerate a variety of situations in which conflicts of interest may develop, see id. at
213-14, and conclude that "the risk of an unforeseen and even unforeseeable conflict
of interest developing is so great that a lawyer should decline multiple representation
unless there is no other way in which adequate representation can be provided to the
defendants." Id. at 214.
152. Conflicts are, of course, less likely to arise in some cases than in others, but
it is submitted that the potential for substantial conflict that exists in every case of
multiple representation justifies a blanket prohibition. See notes 25-54 supra and
accompanying text. Although it may be suggested that some defendants are capable
of giving informed consent to multiple representation, truly informed consent is never-
theless likely to be rare. Moreover, the clients' consent is an insufficient consideration
in view of the substantial public interests involved in the trial of criminal cases. See
notes 142-50 supra and accompanying text.
153. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
154. See id. at 807, 836.
155. See United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1975). But see
Abraham v. United States, 549 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1977).
156. Although a defendant may waive his right to a jury trial, for example, he
has no correlative right to a bench trial. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24
(1965). In so holding, the Supreme Court observed that the "ability to waive a constitu-
tional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of
that right." Id. at 34-35.
157. See 422 U.S. at 832.
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amendment right t6 be represented by counsel of his choice, that
right must arise independently; the power to waive assistance of
counsel does not in itself imply a right to constitutionally defective
legal assistance.
There is, however, no such independent, absolute right to coun-
sel of choice.'1 The right to choose one's legal representative is lim-
ited by several qualifications. An indigent defendant, for example,
does not have an absolute right to be assigned counsel of his choice;
the appointment of counsel is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court.' In addition, no defendant may select an attorney in a manner
that will obstruct the administration of the judicial processw" or frus-
trate the judicial function."' Finally, courts have consistently
spurned defendants' constitutional arguments that they have a sixth
amendment right to be represented by laymen,"2 attorneys not li-
158. The right to counsel of choice and an attorney's right to practice his profes-
sion are not absolute and may be impaired, inter alia, by "state regulation which is
designed to provide for overriding state interests." Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 521,
341 A.2d 896, 901 (1975), aff'd per curiam on rehearing, 466 Pa. 172, 352 A.2d 11, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976); accord, Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273 (1st Cir.
1976); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1976); United States
ex reL Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1970).
Undeniably, various courts have suggested that defendants who retain counsel
have a right of constitutional dimension to representation by counsel of their own
choosing. See, e.g., United States v. Sheiner, 410 F.2d 337, 342 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 825 (1969). But see Abraham v. United States, 549 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir.
1977). Indeed, some have suggested that defendant's right to counsel of choice is
absolute. See, e.g., Reickauer v. Cunningham, 299 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1962); People v.
Walsh, 28 IMI. 2d 405, 409, 192 N.E.2d 843, 845 (1963); Pdople v. Friedrich, 20 IMI. 2d
240, 251, 169 N.E.2d 752, 758 (1960). But see People v. Felder, 22 Ill. App. 3d 737, 317
N.E.2d 595 (1974). At least some of these statements, however, should only be con-
sidered in context. In Reickauer, for example, the court held that a defendant who
was held incommunicado and was refused permission to call his attorney had a right
to retain counsel of choice, rather than accept a lawyer sent by the sheriff. See 299
F.2d at 172.
159. See Tibbetts v. Hand, 294 F.2d 68, 73 (10th Cir. 1961); State v. Hollins, 512
S.W.2d 835, 838 (Mo. App. 1974) ("It is well settled that the constitutional right to
counsel does not mean that the accused is entitled to any particular attorney.").
160. See, e.g., United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 613 (1977); People v. Douglas, 61 Cal. 2d 430,435, 392 P.2d 964, 967, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 884, 887 (1964); People v. Shaw, 46 Cal. App. 2d 768, 774, 117 P.2d 34, 37 (1941);
People v. Felder, 22 Ill. App. 3d 737, 317 N.E.2d 595 (1974); State v. Hollins, 512
S.W.2d 835 (Mo. App. 1974); cf. Kiremer v. Stewart, 378 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (E.D.
Pa. 1974) (defendant's right to attorney of choice may not be exercised to defeat ability
of court to control its docket).
161. See Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273,278 (1st Cir. 1976) (trial court need
not tolerate unwarranted delays and may, at some point, require a defendant to go to
trial even if he is not entirely satisfied with his counsel).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d 1176, 1180 (6th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 2924 (1977); United States v. Cooper, 493 F.2d 473, 474 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 859 (1974); McKinzie v. Ellis, 287 F.2d 549, 551-52 (5th Cir.
1961); Turner v. ABA, 407 F. Supp. 451, 477 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975), afl'd mem. sub nom.
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censed to practice in the forum state,"8 3 or attorneys who have been
disbarred.' Thus, there are many limitations upon the ability of a
defendant to choose counsel under current law. The suggested disci-
plinary rule simply imposes one more: if an attorney represents one
defendant in a particular criminal matter, the other defendants
would have to find legal representation elsewhere.
In the absence of a constitutional right to multiple representa-
tion, it may still be argued that a significant monetary saving to the
defendants would be lost as a result of the proposed ethical prohibi-
tion. A defense lawyer may reduce his fee to each defendant in a
multiple representation case since many facets of his investigation
and research will be common to all of them. One may therefore argue
that the proposed proscription of multiple representation eliminates
an important cost savings to defendants and precludes them from
collectively retaining more competent counsel than any of them could
individually afford.' 5
This argument is an inadequate justification for multiple repre-
sentation. Although significant individual economies are possible
when one attorney represents multiple clients, the hidden costs of
potential conflict are likely to make the benefits of the bargain illu-
sory. Thus, a short-sighted emphasis on immediate monetary consid-
erations may obscure the client's perception of the potential detri-
ments of collective advocacy. Moreover, the pooling of resources is
often merely incidental to the maintenance of a united front. Defen-
dants often fear that to be divided is to be conquered and hope that
by retaining common counsel, they can keep potential antagonists in
a friendly camp.' 6
One must also question the premise that competent legal counsel
Taylor v. Montgomery, 539 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Pilla v. ABA, 542
F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976). Whitesel does contain dictum, however, that a trial court would
not abuse its discretion by allowing a qualified layperson, under certain circumstances,
to represent another. See 543 F.2d at 1180.
163. See Ross v. Reda, 510 F.2d 1172, 1173 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892
(1975); Thomas v. Cassidy, 249 F.2d 91, 92 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958
(1958).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Pilla, 550 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 2954 (1977); United States v. Grismore, 546 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1976).
165. This argument may be initiated by attorneys as often as defendants, but
one can hardly overlook the fact that, unless the attorney reduces his standard fee
by at least fifty percent for each of the defendants, his total fee will be greater than if
he represented only one. As a result, both counsel and defendants may consciously
or unconsciously tend to minimize the dangers of potential conflict in order to obtain
the pecuniary advantage that multiple representation offers.
166. See United States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620, 621-23 (D.N.J. 1977). See
generally notes 146-47 supra and accompanying text.
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is not available to codefendants unless they pool their resources. Al-
though criminal trial lawyers who are experienced and well-
established may charge higher fees than other attorneys, legal fees
vary even among more seasoned practitioners. Competent trial law-
yers whose fees are more affordable are more readily available than
the argument suggests,'6 and the recent removal of proscriptions
against fee advertising' may well facilitate access to lawyers whose
fees are within a defendant's price range. The monetary savings argu-
ment, therefore, is overdrawn and overworked. 6 ' In light of the public
interest involved in multiple representation cases, the availability of
wholesale pricing of legal services hardly countermands the lawyer's
ethical obligations.
Finally the costs to the government of compelling separate coun-
sel for indigent defendants must also be considered.7 0 It is worthy of
note that indigent defendants have initially been provided separate
counsel in all federal cases in the District of Columbia for ten years.''
The costs of the proposal therefore should not be deemed prohibi-
tive. More important, the appointment of separate counsel for code-
fendants may actually be cost efficient since government expenses
involved in appeals and habeas corpus petitions based on alleged
167. See Cole, supra note 133, at 154.
168. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
169. This argument, perhaps more than any other, illustrates the validity of
Professor Morgan's contention that the legal profession consistently ignores the inter-
ests of the public, and even their clients, whenever they conflict with the interests of
the lawyer. See note 2 supra. Since lawyers benefit financially from multiple represen-
tation, they will emphasize the benefits of the practice to defendants-the possible cost
savings and the defendant's freedom of choice-but largely ignore the burdens that
multiple representation imposes upon the public and defendants.
170. In indigent cases, the proposed prohibition arguably disqualifies an entire
public defender agency since a conflict of interest for one member of a "firm" disquali-
fies all other lawyers in the "firm." See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RasPONsammrr DR
5-105(D). The rule, therefore, may present an acute problem for the only available
public defender in a particular jurisdiction. At least one court, however, has concluded
that lawyers in a public defender organization may overcome the inference that the
knowledge of an attorney is obtained by his associates. See People v. Wilkins. 28
N.Y.2d 53, 56-57, 268 N.E.2d 756, 757-58, 320 N.Y.S.2d 8, 10-11 (1971). The harshness
of the vicarious disqualification rule could be averted in public defender cases by
isolating the defenders involved in the case from each other in a manner satisfactory
to the court. The attorneys could affirm that they would not discuss the matter with
other defenders involved in the case and that access to the files pertaining to each case
would be carefully limited. Although an isolation rule has never been applied in public
defender cases, it has been advocated in the context of conflicts involving former
government attorneys who join law firms engaged in suit against the government. See
Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977); ABA Co.M.u. ON PROFESSIONAL
ETmICS, OPINIONs, No. 342 (1975); NEW Yoa CITv BAR Ass'N CoIM. o N PROFEssIONAL
ETHICS, OPINIONs, No. 889 (1976).
171. See Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123, 125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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violations of the sixth amendment would be saved and the substan-
tial costs of new trials avoided.
Stirrings of dissatisfaction with present multiple representation
practices are widespread"' and eminently justified:
The right to effective representation by counsel whose loyalty is
undivided is so paramount in the proper administration of criminal
justice that it must in some cases take precedence over all other
considerations, including the expressed preference of the defendants
concerned and their attorney.
Our burgeoning criminal calendars and the need to try a larger
percentage of criminal cases under the provisions of the Speedy
Trial Act and court rules for the prompt disposition of criminal cases
have made it all the more necessary for our federal trial courts to
take all measures to avoid the necessity for the retrial of multi-
defendant cases. One such measure is to require separate counsel for
each defendant in a multi-defendant case." 3
Unless an absolute ban on these practices is promulgated, conflicts
will continue to arise, defendants' interests will continue to be preju-
diced, and society itself will suffer. The proposed rule would effec-
tively bring to an end these recurring problems. Rather than impair-
ing the right of defendants to effective legal assistance, it would pro-
mote it.
172. See, e.g, United States v. Mari, 526 F.2d 117, 119-21 (2d Cir. 1975) (Oakes,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976); Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting); People v. Morga, 273 Cal. App. 2d 200,
216-17, 78 Cal. Rptr. 120, 131 (1969) (Kaus, J., dissenting). In Mari Judge Oakes
observed, "The time is rapidly approaching . . . when, in light of more exacting
standards of the Bar and the decisions of other leading courts, we may have to reexam-
ine our rule." 526 F.2d at 119.
173. United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1058 (2d Cir. 1976) (Lumbard, J.,
concurring).
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